Research On Equilibrium Decision And Demand Forecasting Strategy Of Independent Remanufacturing Closed Loop Supply Chain Based On Government Subsidies And Multivalued Chains

Remanufacturing is an important development direction in China’s plan to accelerate the construction of a new development pattern with domestic systemic circulation as the main body and domestic and international double circulation promoting each other.In the remanufacturing industry,independent remanufacturing enterprises,as enterprises with self-developed innovative remanufacturing technologies and closer to the second-hand product market,play an important role as suppliers of recycled materials and components for remanufacturing enterprises.However,due to internal and external reasons,independent remanufacturing enterprises both domestically and internationally still develop slowly despite starting late,which is not conducive to China’s low-carbon and green industrial transformation.On the basis of reading a large number of literature,this article summarizes the two main external and internal factors that hinder the development of independent remanufacturing enterprises from the surface to the inside.Externally,the supporting systems for independent remanufacturing supply chains,including reward and punishment systems,are in a blank state.Independent remanufacturing enterprises face high remanufacturing costs in the recycling and remanufacturing process due to factors such as difficulty in remanufacturing technology and limited recycling channels,without subsidies for recycling,resulting in reduced profit margins.Internally,independent remanufacturing enterprises face significant fluctuations in downstream consumer demand,and various factors make it difficult to predict monthly order quantities.The bullwhip effect is not conducive to the coordination and control of various links in the supply chain,greatly weakening the competitiveness of the independent remanufacturing supply chain.Therefore,this article conducts research on two aspects: external and internal obstacles.First of all,this paper studies the equilibrium decision of independent remanufacturing supply chain under government recycling subsidies.Considering that consumers in the market have different Willingness to pay for remanufactured products,the government grants a certain proportion of subsidies to independent remanufacturers through recycling and remanufacturing,and incorporates actual factors such as government carbon quotas,carbon rights trading markets,and low-carbon technology R&D investment into the supply chain,The study analyzed the closed-loop supply chain structure of remanufacturing with only one independent remanufacturer and retailer,established a game model between the government and enterprises,and explored the impact of government recycling subsidies on wholesale prices,retail prices,recycling rates of independent remanufacturers,as well as on the profits and social benefits of supply chain members.The optimal government recycling subsidy policy was sought under the maximization of social benefits,And the research conclusion was verified through numerical examples,and the impact of government subsidy recovery and cost recovery coefficient on social welfare was discussed.The results indicate that there is a maximum value of government subsidies for recycling and remanufacturing,which maximizes social welfare.Government subsidies increase the recycling and remanufacturing rate(degree of greening)of the remanufacturing supply chain,which will effectively motivate independent remanufacturers to engage in recycling and remanufacturing behavior;2)The subsidy level should be relatively small,and this maximum value is related to parameters such as recycling and remanufacturing costs,recycling and remanufacturing savings,historical maximum value of products,and environmental responsibility index of green consumers.The emission reduction rate of enterprises indirectly affects the subsidy level;3)Under certain conditions,the optimal subsidy ratio increases the profits of remanufacturers and supply chains,and the motivation for independent remanufacturers to participate in low-carbon recycling production will increase.However,the optimal profit level of retailers will decrease,and the reduction level is not significant.