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Government Subsidy Strategy Of Distributor Remanufacturing Closed-loop Supply Chain

Posted on:2021-03-21Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W J XuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330602977858Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In order to improve the efficiency of resource utilization and reduce environmental pollution,remanufacturing has become a common concern of the government,enterprises and academia.Considering the remanufacturability of the product in the design stage can greatly improve the remanufacturing efficiency.This paper takes distributor remanufacturing as the research background.In this mode,manufacturer is responsible for remanufacturing design and distributor is responsible for remanufacturing,both of which play an important role in economic development and environmental protection,which makes it difficult for the government to choose subsidy object.Therefore,based on distributor remanufacturing,this paper delves into the selection of the government's optimal subsidy strategy.Specific research contents are as follows:Based on the relationship between remanufacturing design level and remanufacturing cost,this paper conducts a series of studies on a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a distributor,mainly divided into two parts: the government does not participate in the game and participates in the game.When the government does not participate in the game,firstly,considering the situation of supply chain incoordination,and established a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game in the three cases: no government subsidy,government-subsidized distributor remanufacturing and government-subsidized manufacturer remanufacturing design.The reverse solving method was used to get the equilibrium solution.The effects of the two subsidy methods on the remanufacturing design level,pricing and profit of supply chain member enterprises were analyzed and compared.Based on the government's equivalent subsidy expenditure as the prerequisite for decision-making,the optimal government subsidy method was studied based on the decision-making basis of the remanufacturing design level and the profit of the member enterprises in the supply chain.Then,considered the situation of supply chain coordination,designed R&D cost sharing contracts,and explored the impact of supply chain coordination on the decisions of manufacturer,distributor and government.Specifically,including the effectiveness of R&D cost-sharing contract and changes of government's optimal subsidy strategy under the same decision-making premise and basis.Finally,according to the government's participation in the game,three-party dynamic game model was established in four scenarios: supply chain incoordination and subsidies for distributor,supply chain incoordination and subsidies for manufacturer,supply chain coordination and subsidies for distributor,supply chain coordination and subsidies for manufacturer.The optimal subsidy strategy of the government was studied by taking the remanufacturing design level and the profit of three players as the decision-making basis.The results indicate that government subsidies will reduce the sales price of new product and remanufactured product,improve the demand for remanufactured product and the remanufacturing design level.In the case that the demand for new product is greater than remanufactured product,both subsidy strategies can reduce the sales volume of new product,while when the demand for the two is equal,the opposite effect will be achieved.In the case that the demand for new product is greater than remanufactured product and on the premise that the government subsidy expenditure is equal,the manufacturer and distributor have higher profits when the government subsidizes the distributor,while the remanufacturing design level is higher when the government subsidizes the manufacturer.Coordinated supply chain provides a positive boost to supply chain and is more beneficial to manufacturer,but it will not change the government's optimal strategy under the same decision-making premise and basis.When the government participates in the game,under the same decision-making basis,the government's optimal subsidy strategy remains unchanged when the supply chain is not coordinated.But when the supply chain is coordinated,subsiding distributor is the optimal choice,whether evaluated from the income level of the three players or from the remanufacturing design level.
Keywords/Search Tags:distributor remanufacturing, closed loop supply chain, government subsidies, Stackelberg game
PDF Full Text Request
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