Research On The Influence Of CEO’s Financial Background On Shadow Banking Of Non-financial Enterprises And Its Mechanism

With the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis,the popularity of the virtual economy continued to increase,and its influence gradually surpassed that of the real economy,presenting a structural imbalance between the two.Due to the demand for absolute profits and risk prevention,more and more enterprises with financial advantages are choosing to invest in financial assets and "banking like" businesses.The scale of shadow banking for non-financial enterprises is increasing,gradually becoming a hot topic of social concern.The shadow banking of non-financial enterprises,as an innovative financial method,can to some extent bring investment returns beyond the main business of enterprises and alleviate the financing constraints of small and medium-sized enterprises.However,it also has strong concealment and high risk.At present,there are some imperfect systems for the lending and supervision of funds in the market,and the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises also has high regulatory difficulties.If not paid attention to it,it can cause serious problems.Therefore,how to prevent its systemic financial risks has become an important issue.This thesis,by reviewing literature and starting from the personal characteristics of managers,explores the impact and mechanism of CEO financial background on the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises.According to the definition of shadow banking for non-financial enterprises in this thesis,the scale of shadow banking for non-financial enterprises in China in the past decade was calculated using annual data of non-financial enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2008 to 2021.By conducting benchmark regression on the data,the impact of CEO financial background on the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises was studied,and the following empirical results were obtained:(1)CEO financial background promoted the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises;(2)Compared to CEOs with only banking background in enterprises,CEOs with only financial background outside of banking background are more likely to promote the scale of shadow banking in enterprises;(3)The results of mechanism test show that financing constraints,risk appetite and risk bearing capacity present mesomeric effect;(4)The attention of the four major international auditors and analysts shows moderating effects;(5)Further research has shown that in situations where CEO power is high and executive compensation incentives are high,CEO financial background is more likely to promote shadow banking in non-financial enterprises.Based on the results of empirical analysis,this thesis proposes policy recommendations from multiple perspectives: enterprises should diversify their recruitment of executives with different backgrounds;Management should always be vigilant about the negative impact of branding theory,and managers should supervise each other;Government departments should introduce policies to encourage traditional banks to develop innovative financial products,while helping small and medium-sized enterprises alleviate financing constraints and strengthen guidance and supervision of enterprises.