| In the critical period of comprehensively deepening the reform,how to deal with the long-standing problem of emphasizing competition and neglecting cooperation among local governments under the condition of compatibility of incentives is important for the high-quality economic development in China.However,regional collaborative cooperation often stays on paper and slogans,especially when dealing with some affairs relating to externality and public goods,the degree of coordination and cooperation is much lower than what the central government expects.To make matters worse,the failure seems to be more significant in places where coordination is more needed.The lack of cooperation among local governments is particularly problematic in environmental pollution controls.Due to the spatial spillover characteristics of environmental pollution,it is difficult for any place to be immune to regional environmental problems.Therefore,it is a necessary means to improve the overall environmental quality for local governments adjacent to each other to break down administrative barriers and carry out environmental governance in a coordinated manner.However,the competing local governments in fiscal revenue and political promotion are driven by their own interests,they usually do not have the motivation to invest enough resources to control local pollution,even relocate pollution sources to border areas or take the initiative to relax environmental supervision in border areas.Pollution is transferred to its neighboring areas,so it is difficult to achieve long-term cooperation in environmental coordinated governance only by relying on the local government’s spontaneous efforts,and it will fall into the “prisoner’s dilemma” of competing for pollution.Therefore,it is of great significance in promoting coordinated regional development how to sort out the coordination mechanism among local governments and solve the prisoner’s dilemma induced by the vertical decentralization between the central and local governments and the horizontal competition among local governments without damaging the political incentives of government competition.It is not only the core problem of solving regional air pollution,but also is important for the high-quality economic development in China.Combining the spatial spillover characteristics of air pollution and the government governance system of political promotion championship centered on economic development,this paper takes the coordination mechanism of regional air pollution prevention and control in the Yangtze River Delta(YRD)region as a quasinatural experiment,based on the relationship of central-local,local governmententerprise,and the change of their game behavior in the process of policy implementation,this paper investigates the coordination mechanism for air pollution control,the governance effect of regional air pollution collaborative governance policies(the direct effect of policies through the impact of government governance behaviors),the impact of air pollution joint prevention and control collaboration mechanism on the green innovation behavior of enterprises(the indirect effect of policies),which provide theoretical foundations for high-quality economic development and the modernization of the governance capacity of the national governance system.The main conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows:First,this paper based on the theory of government competition,contract theory and local government incentive theory,combining the characteristics of air pollution(transportability)and the Chinese special political system(the principal-agent relationship between central and local governments and the competition and cooperation relationship between local governments),I construct the game model of air pollution control between local governments,trying to investigate coordination mechanism for air pollution control.The study found that the transportability of air pollution increases the difficulty of pollution control,hence,local governments lack the willingness to actively coordinate air pollution control.The characteristics of these elements ensure the supervision mechanism,normalization mechanism and credibility of local governments respectively,thus promoting long-term cooperation among local governments on atmospheric governance.Under the influence of the above factors,the joint prevention and control mechanism of air pollution in the Yangtze River Delta can effectively enhance the governance motivation of local governments,thereby promoting the governance behavior of local governments from non-cooperative games to cooperative games.Second,this paper constructs the panel data of daily average air quality of 48 major cities in China from 2013 to 2017 and uses the difference in difference empirical method to discuss the policy effect of the regional air pollution collaborative governance,which is also the direct effect of the policy.The results found that with the continuous advancement of the joint prevention and control policy,the concentrations of PM2.5,PM10 and the AQI in the YRD decrease significantly,and the air quality in the Yangtze River Delta region continued to improve compared with the control group cities,which supported the theoretical model part of the previous article.The three elements of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Collaboration Mechanism in Yangtze River Delta Regional have played a role in continuous coordination,supervision,restraint on the governance behavior of the local government,and constantly strengthen the local government’s governance willingness.Further,this paper studies the heterogeneity and mechanism of local government collaborative governance in the Yangtze River Delta.The results showed that the local governments have some strategic governance behaviors.The pollutant concentration decreased the most in the two months before and one month after the meeting.In autumn and winter with frequent heavy pollution,the policy effect is more significant,but there is no significant treatment effect in spring and summer.The governance effect of the air pollution joint prevention and control in the regional inter provincial border areas is better than that in the internal areas,which shows that the joint prevention and control policy push local governments to pay more effort to the governance of the inter provincial border areas in the region,to reduce the transmission of pollution between provinces in the YRD.This paper also finds that the substantive governance and rectification of pollution sources such as straw burning,motor vehicle and enterprise pollution emissions by local governments in the region is an important channel for the continuous improvement of air quality in the YRD.Finally,the results show that the implementation of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Collaborative Mechanism in YRD has resulted in a significant decrease in PM10 concentration in the region,and the monetary value of the health benefits generated is 8.4527 billion yuan.Thirdly,based on the above research conclusions,using the green patent data of China’s A-share listed enterprises from 2010 to 2017,this paper takes the difference in difference method to explore the impact of regional air pollution collaborative governance policy on enterprises’ green technology innovation behavior,which is the indirect effect of the policy.The study finds that since the implementation of the policy,the support of local government environmental protection subsidy projects,the stability of environmental governance policies,and the increase of enterprise environmental compliance costs have led to a significant increase in the number of authorized green patents of enterprises in the YRD,especially the level of green technology innovation of enterprises in inter provincial border areas has been significantly improved after the implementation of the policy.However,the role of this policy in promoting the level of green technology innovation of enterprises is mainly aimed at non-state-owned enterprises,while it has no significant impact on state-owned enterprises in the region,which may be related to the greater bargaining power of state-owned enterprises.Further,this paper finds that,affected by the governance behavior of local governments in the process of policy implementation,the green innovation behavior of enterprises has a certain strategic nature.The number of green utility model patents of enterprises has increased significantly after the implementation of the policy,but the invention patents that promote the substantive innovation of enterprises have not changed significantly,indicating that although the implementation of the policy promotes the green technology innovation of enterprises in the region,However,because the environmental governance behavior of local governments in the YRD distorts the innovation incentive to enterprises,enterprises strategically increase the number of innovation in order to seek support,and the innovation quality has not been significantly improved.To sum up,the research conclusions have important practical significance for promoting local governments to break interest barriers and policy administrative barriers,forming a new mechanism of regional coordinated development with overall planning,orderly competition,green coordination,sharing and win-win,and realize the balance between environmental governance and economic development.The contributions of this paper are mainly reflected in the following aspects:First,based on the spatial spillover characteristics of air pollution and the political system with Chinese characteristics,taking the joint prevention and control of air pollution as an example,this paper explains the formation mechanism of coordinated control of air pollution by local governments.The research results make up for the shortcomings of the existing literature to a certain extent,providing theoretical support for continuing to deepen the central led coordination mechanism among local governments,to effectively promote the cross regional coordinated development strategy.The research results of this paper find that central coordination,repeated games and verifiable results ensure the supervision mechanism,normalization mechanism and credibility of local cooperation respectively,and promote long-term cooperation between local governments on air pollution,which provides reference experience for regional collaborative governance in a wider range and more fields.Second,from the perspective of local government cooperation,this paper explores the effect of the joint prevention and control policy of air pollution on regional air pollution,which enriches the relevant research in the field of environmental governance.Taking the cooperative mechanism of air pollution prevention and control in the YRD as the research object,this paper fully demonstrates the governance effect,impact channels and social welfare of the policy,expanding the relevant research in the field of environmental governance,which helps to understand the cross regional and regional pollution cooperative governance mechanism under the decentralization system with Chinese characteristics from a more micro perspective.Third,this paper analyzes the impact of thecooperation mechanism for air pollution prevention and control in the Yangtze River Delta on enterprises’ green technology innovation behavior from multiple dimensions,providing micro evidence of Porter hypothesis in developing countries,enriches the relevant research on existing environmental regulation and enterprise innovation,which provide a theoretical reference for achieving coordinated development,green development and innovation driven development under the concept of high-quality economic development.Fourth,the research results of this paper can provide experience and Enlightenment for regional cooperation in a wider range and more fields,such as water pollution control in the upstream and downstream of inter provincial basins,overcapacity control and cross regional financial risk prevention,which require local governments to carry out cross regional cooperation.Taking water pollution control as an example,the research conclusion of this paper has reference significance for cross regional collaborative governance of water pollution,that is,according to the characteristics of water pollution and the constraints faced by local governments,the central government should participate in the local game from top to bottom,and strengthen the cooperation ability and willingness of local governments by ensuring the continuous promotion of cooperation policies and the verifiable results,promoting cross regional collaborative governance. |
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