Optimal Differential Pricing Model For Closed-loop Supply Chain With Retailer And The Third Party Collecting Under Stochastic Disruption And Stochastic Demand

In this thesis,stochastic optimization and Stackelberg game theory and method are used.Under the assumption of stochastic disruption and stochastic demand,the optimal differential pricing of the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer?one retailer and a third party is studied.In order to maximize the profit of each member in closed-loop supply chain,the model of the third party collection and the retailer collection for closed-loop supply chain are established,and the two kinds of optimal differential pricing problem of recycling models are discussed.This thesis analyzes the Stackelberg decision of the manufacturer as the leader,retailer and third party as the followers in the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain.The optimal coordination strategy of two kinds of recycling models under decentralized decision are given,and the optimal price combination?optimal recycling rate and contract variable are obtained.The empirical results show that the optimal price increases with the increase of the interruption probability.