Research On The Closed-loop Supply Chain Game Model With Different Recycling Modes In The Environment Of Chain And Chain Competition

As the market competition intensifies,the competition among enterprises in the same industry has changed into the competition among supply chains.In addtion,the remanufacturing industry makes the traditional string supply chain structure gradually change into closed-loop supply chain system.Based on this background,this paper examines the game equilibrium strategy of closed-loop supply chain with different collection modes in chain-to-chain competition environment.Firstly,the game equilibrium strategies and profit distribution results of two competitive closed-loop supply chains dominated by two manufacturers are studied under three given different collection mode combinations(MR,RT and MT).Secondly,considering that the manufacturer in each chain can select one collection channel between two collection modes(R/T or M/T combination),a multi-stage dynamic game model is established to obtain the equilibrium of collection mode selection of the two chains.Finally,we consider the game equilibrium strategy of two competitive closed-loop supply chains with different dominant parties and same or different collection modes.The findings suggest:(1)In a total of six chains given three different collection combinations,consumers prefer to buy the prodcuts from the retailer's collection chain from the Consumer Welfare Perspective;When the profitability level parameter of collection and remanufacturing is below the threshold,the collection rate of MT-M chain is the highest,whereas when the parameter is above the threshold,the collection rate of RT-R chain is the highest,and the total collection rate of double chain in MR combination is the highest.From the perspective of single chain,a retailer's collection chain should be formed for each chain if its competitive chain chooses manufacturer collection mode or third-party collection mode.A chain should form a manufacturer collection chain from the perspective of the whole chain if the retailer is entrusted with the collection in its competitive chain.(2)When the collection modes are not given but chosen by the manufacturers,if the manufacturer in each chain can choose either retailer collection mode or third-party collection mode,the collection mode equilibrium may be asymmetric,that is,one chain chooses retailer collection mode while the other chain chooses third-party collection mode,and there exists a prisoner's dilemma;if the manufacturer in each chain can choose either manufacturer collection mode or third-party collection mode,the collection mode equilibrium is symmetric equilibrium and there is no prisoner's dilemma.(3)Where one chain is the manufacturer's dominant chain and the other is the retailer's dominant chain,by comparing the equilibrium solution and profit distribution of three game models(MMRM,MMRR and MRRR)formed by the combinations of three collection modes(MM,MR and RR),it can be concluded that,from the perspective of consumer welfare,no matter what level of profitability of collection and remanufacturing is,the consumers prefer to buy products from the manufacturer-led and retailer collection chain in MRRR combination;from the perspective of environmental performance for a single chain,it would be more efficient for manufacturer-led chain to adopt retailer collection mode,and more efficient for retailer-led chain to adopt manufacturer collection mode;from the perspective of the chain members' profit in six chains,it is a strictly dominant strategy for the manufacturer in manufacturer-led chain to adopts retailer collection strategy.The manufacturer's profit with which collection mode in retailer-led chain is better depends on the profitability level of collection and remanufacturing.When the profitability level parameter is lower than the corresponding threshold value,the manufacturer's profit is higher in manufacturer collection mode.