Closed-loop Supply Chain Game Decision-making Considering Fairness Preference And Green Innovation

With the development of science and technology,the continuous improvement of the economic level,the upgrading of electrical and electronic products is accelerating and a large amount of electrical and electronic waste is generated.For resource recycling and environmental protection,closed-loop supply chain management has become an inevitable trend for enterprise development.The first two chapters of this paper mainly introduce the research background of the paper,the significance,the literature review,the research innovation,the research methods and the relevant theories and basic concepts in the supply chain field to understand the development process of the green supply chain,green innovation and fairness preferences behavior.The third chapter is to establish four game models for the strategy of combining fairness preference and green innovation on the basis of existing research.The game model of each strategy obtains the equilibrium results separately and conducts a comprehensive analysis of demand,green innovation efforts,profits,and utility.The research results show that: Firstly,the green innovation effort,product demand,manufacturer profit,retailer profit,total system profit and retailer utility in the two types of green supply chain models of manufacturers' promotion of green innovation and Manufacturer's Fair Preference(MM)strategy and retailer's promotion of green innovation and manufacturer's fair preference(RM)strategy are all negatively correlated with the manufacturer's preference coefficient relationship.Secondly,in the manufacturers' promotion of green innovation and Retailer's Fair Preference(MR)strategy,when the retailer's fair preference coefficient is controlled within a reasonable range,it will help increase the retailer's profit.Green innovation effort,product demand,manufacturer's profit,total system profit,and manufacturer's utility are all negatively correlated with the retailer's preference coefficient.In the retailers' promotion of green innovation and retailer's fair preference(RR)strategy,the retailer's green innovation efforts,product demand,and total system profit have nothing to do with the retailer's fair preference,and both the manufacturer's profit and the manufacturer's utility have a negative correlation with the retailer's preference coefficient.Thirdly,the product demand,manufacturer's profit,retailer's profit,total system profit,manufacturer's utility and retailer's utility of RM strategy are all higher than MM strategy.Fourthly,the product demand,manufacturer's profit,retailer's profit,total system profit,manufacturer's utility and retailer's utility of RR strategy are all higher than MR strategy.Fifthly,Among the four strategies,RR is the best choice strategy.The product demand,retailer profit,and total system profit of the RR strategy are optimal.When the retailer preference coefficient satisfies certain conditions,manufacturer's profit of the RR strategy is the best,otherwise manufacturer's profit of the RM strategy is the best.The forth chapter is based on the conclusions of the third chapter and carries out numerical simulation analysis with the parameter values of the existing research to verify the validity and correctness of the conclusions.The last chapter summarizes the conclusions of this paper,provides specific suggestions for manufacturers,retailers and the government,and puts forward prospects for future research.