Guaranteed Game And Power Dependence: China's International Petroleum Cooperation Research

This paper selects China's external petroleum cooperation system as the main research sample,by analyzing the existing international petroleum cooperation systems,explored the operational logic between the institutional evolution of oil cooperation and the choice of national foreign oil cooperation behaviors,provided deeper understanding for China's international participation path of the energy cooperation.The logical starting point of the article research is based on the “asymmetric development relationship” between countries,which is manifested in the constraint effect of different countries' institutional capacity on national intention and behavioral ability.Country has “path dependence” in the evolutions of the system,based on the determination of its own strength and the state intention of the stage,constantly modifying the state behavior and looking for a cooperative option that combines the best returns and state equilibrium,it's the result of rational strategic choices and factors shaping.Among them,the expression of “rational strategic choice” is the“guarantee game”,and behavior carried out by the state,potential partners in the international and regional palaces,based on the internal structural pressure judgment in the cooperative environment,selecting the corresponding state behavior,subjective Passive.“Factors shaping” is the result of “power dependence”,potential partners of international and regional palaces which based on the external checks and balances of the pressure in the cooperative environment,judging the corresponding state behavior with subjective initiative.At the same time,combined with the theoretical development of the evolution of China's international petroleum cooperation system,it increases the analysis of the variables in the evolution of the system,and classifies the national intentions and behaviors that the country changes according to other countries' policies and behavior adjustments as “self factors”: capacity,institutional benefits,institutional behaviors,institutional game outcomes.The national intentions and behaviors of other countries that change according to their own policies and behavior adjustments are classified as “adverse factors”,specifically the choice of income in the political or economic category.By analyzing interaction behavior of state in the evolution of the petroleum cooperation system,it is proposed that Chinese international petroleum cooperation system has experienced the evolution process from dependence-participation-partialleading system,which is summarized as: institutional dependency period,system cooperation period,system checks and balance period.At the same time,based on the role of “guarantee game” and “power dependence” on the choice of national petroleum cooperation system and behavior shaping,rationalize the trend of China's participation in energy system cooperation,and put forward the important role of“interactive structure” in comprehensively improving the capacity of the national system.It is divided into two levels: the upstream inter-state relationship structure,the mid-stream signal constraint structure,and the downstream circulation transaction structure,“interactive structure” will provide a cooperative game path for China's full integration into international energy cooperation.