Wittgenstein And Intentional Issues

The problem of intentionality have unique pattern of manifestation in Wittgenstein’s context. An "identification" of the pattern shows that the themes it conveys are at center position in each stage of development of his philosophy. And in the context of both earlier and later period of Wittgenstein’s thought, these themes vary qualitatively.The earlier thought of intentionality manifests itself particularly in the representational theory of proposition. The latter is based on a kind of presupposed theory of logic-metaphysic isomorphism and is consisted of the picture theory of proposition and the method of projection. Its basic contention is:a picture’s representing reality lies in its common logical structure with the latter. However, since the nineteen thirties onwards, through the criticism of Russell’s concept of causality on the problem of intentionality, Wittgenstein abandoned this isomorphism as the theoretical core of picture theory. In his middle period of thought, Wittgenstein started discussing intentionality with awareness and motive-the relationship between thought and reality was elaborated specifically under the relationship between order and execution, proposition and what makes it true-and accomplished the "linguistic turn" of his investigation on intentionality. The view of intentionality for the later Wittgenstein firstly and mainly reflected in his criticism of the Augustine picture of language. By means of this criticism, Wittgenstein repudiated psychologism, i. e. the idea that there exists so-called mental state and process in our mind. The way he solves or eliminates this idea is by performing grammar investigation on those psychological concepts and expressions (belief, pain, expectation, etc). The problem of aspect-perception has a special status in Wittgenstein’s later research on intentionality and the relevant inquiry in a certain sense marks a "phenomenological turn" in his treatment of intentionality. To some extent, these problems depart Wittgenstein from the way he used to discuss intentionality and makes it possible a dialogue between him and phenomenology. In discussing the problem of aspect-perception, Wittgenstein attempts to clarify those confusions caused in expressing and describing perceptual phenomena using the concept "seeing" and clears them up by analyzing grammatically and conceptually.In research on the problem of intentionality, there are mainly two different traditions-phenomenology and analytical philosophy-which Wittgenstein has himself many direct or indirect dialogues. He denies and criticizes Brentano’s earlier viewpoints on intentionality and holds that the inner perception which Brentano used to address intentionality as the mark of the mental has no certainty at all. In discussing aspect-perception, Husserl treats hyle as a real constituent of intentional experience in aspect-dawning and believes that we could describe the latter on account of our self-evident inner; Wittgenstein, on the contrary, regards not aspect-dawning as "perceptual experience" and devotes himself in grammar investigation of relevant phenomena of aspect-perception. Still, Wittgenstein has a similar position with Husserl in rejecting the idea of perceptual given which is hold by empiricism. In discussing intentionality, Wittgenstein also inherits from and criticizes Frege. Based on the picture theory in his earlier period, Wittgenstein criticizes the meaning theory of Frege from his anti-psychologism standpoint and maintains that the latter is not equal to explain the intentionality of thought. The context principle of earlier Wittgenstein has its root in Frege’s context principle, and that the context principle of later Wittgenstein is an extension of the latter based on criticism and is a basic principle in understanding his viewpoints on sense and meaning. The later Wittgenstein perceives that context principle of Frege’s cannot ensure him a firm standpoint of anti-psychologism in his meaning theory and its very essence is still a kind of application of Augustine picture. Furthermore, the idea of "language game" is just obtained on the basis of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Augustine picture and Frege’s theory of sense and meaning.The method Wittgenstein applies in his research of intentionality is grammar investigation. It leads our attention to the actual use of psychological words and by doing so criticizes the idea of a realistic "inner" which is in fact a sort of essentialism based on Cartesian dualism. This method runs through Wittgenstein’s repudiation of Augustine picture, his distinction between intentional attitude and state of consciousness and criticism of the idea of "sense-data". Daniel D. Dennett inherits and develops his position from Wittgenstein in rejecting essentialism, though his hetero-phenomenology lacks attention to the actual expressiveness of psychological words. Saul Kripke proposes "skeptical paradox" through reading Wittgenstein’s investigation on meaning and understanding and holds that the endless regression in interpreting meaning of words makes it impossible for us to understand them. However, the paradox is a result of absolutization of Wittgenstein’s relevant viewpoints. P.M.S. Hacker thinks that, through elucidation of the internal relation between thought and reality, Wittgenstein has provided us a solution to the problems and confusions of intentionality. Time Crane questions Hacker’s position and points out that the grammatical relation between sentence describing thought and description of what makes it true is not capable of explaining intentionality. Besides, that meaning as intentional content contained in intentional expressions is unable to reach a consensus with those practical possibilities of reality. Yet the perspective of Crane is just another extension of Augustine picture trying to analyze and understand the complexity of rules of grammar in daily language games. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s standpoint is that our certainty towards intentional expressions does not depend on explanations but on description of grammatical rules. This position of description precisely illustrates the most important method for the middle and later Wittgenstein in his research on problems of intentionality-grammar investigation.