A Study On The Changes Of Contemporary Chinese Parliamentary Relations

The dissertation begins with the academic debate on the combination of legislative and executive powers in China. There is a serious mistake in the academic debate. After the analysis of the original literature, the exact meaning of the concept of the combination of legislative and executive powers is clear. Then the exact meaning of the legislative-executive relations can be defined. Based on this work, the dissertation starts to the study of the change of the legislative-executive relations in China. It gave a whole historical analysis on the institution experiments in the revaluation and the institution formations in the governance of China in response to the academic debate before. The Communist Party of China made a certain number of experiments of the legislative-executive relations in the revaluation in Red Region, Border Region and People’s Government of North China and got a deeper understanding of the legislative-executive relations. Then the Communist Party of China readjusted the institution formations. The debates were unavoidable in the institution experiments. The first debate on the combination of legislative and executive powers appeared in Border Region. The change of the legislative-executive relations in the governance of China can be divided into three stages, they were building, winding and rebuilding. The change of the system of the People’s Congress was a key marker of the change of the legislative-executive relations in China. But they are not the same. The background of State-building by Party testifies the close connection between the change of the legislative-executive relations in China and the Communist Party of China. The core of the change is that the party organized the state power structure with its own organization principle of democratic centralism. There were four types of democratic centralism which were the combination of party-state and static-dynamic. The tension between them largely determined the status of the change of the legislative-executive relations in China. After transferred the governance logic, the legislative-executive relations at the national level was unique. However there is a certain time difference between transferred to the governance logic and established the People’s Congress system. In the time without the People’s Congress system, letters from and visits of the people offered a balance structure to the legislative-executive relations. And it played a balanceable role continually in the change of the legislative-executive relations. It had a direct impact on the role design of the people’s representatives and an indirect impact on the role design of the People’s Congress which was a key marker of the change of the legislative-executive relations in China. There are two questions which cannot be sidestepped in the study of the change of the legislative-executive relations in China. The first question is why it changed. The second question is why it changed in this way. To some extent, the new institutional paradigm improved the old institutional paradigm with these two questions. Obviously, the first question is about the power resources of the change and the second question is about the developing direction of the change. In the change of the change of the legislative-executive relations in China, the answer to the first question is the uncertainty of the instrument formation and the imbalance of the instrument structure, and the answer to the second question is the dual nature of anti-formalism and the development of the Communist Party of China’s understanding of the value.