Research On Pricing And Coordination Mechanism Of Closed-loop Supply Chain Under Government Intervention

Currently, extended producer responsibility has been widely used among theenvironmental legislation in the world, especially in China,"waste electrical andelectronic product recycling regulations" provisions government to encourageelectrical and electronic product manufacturers themselves or retailers, serviceagencies, The third party recyclers recycling waste electrical and electronic productsby the State to establish a unified fund as subsidy. Based on these realities and thelatest developments of closed-loop supply chain management, This paper studies theissues such as pricing and coordination mechanisms of closed-loop supply chain inthe case of the government interferencing the manufacturer’s remanufacturingbehavior by incentives and penalties.1. This paper studies the pricing mechanism of closed-loop supply chain with twomanufacturers competing and government intervention. Three models are constructedand compared: both of two manufacturers do not recycle, one manufacturer recycleand the other do not recycle, both of the two manufacturers recycle. The degree ofcompetition among manufacturers, the government rewards and penalties, therecovery of the cost savings effects on competition decision results were analyzed.Finally, a numerical example demonstrates the conclusions.2. This paper studies the recycling channel selection of closed-loop supply chainunder government intervention. Three models are constructed and compared: themanufacturer recycles, the retailer recycles and both of them recycle. The degree ofrecycling competition coefficient, the government rewards and penalties effects onrecycling channel selection were analyzed. Finally, a numerical example demonstratesthe conclusions.3. This paper studies the pricing and coordination mechanism of closed-loop supplychain with retailer recycling under government intervention. First, two decentralizeddecision-making models with and without government intervention are constructedand compared. For the two models the wholesale price, retail price, recycling of wasteproducts price and profits are comparative analysed. Then, As a comparison standard,a centralized decision-making model with government intervention is constructed. Arevenue and expense sharing contract is proposed to coordinate the closed-loopsupply chain symstem. Finally, a numerical example demonstrates the conclusions.4. This paper studies the pricing and coordination mechanism of a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain with manufacturer recycling under government intervention.First, two decentralized decision-making models with and without governmentintervention are constructed and compared. For the two models the wholesale price,retail price, recycling rate of waste products and profit are comparative analysed.Then, As a comparison standard, a centralized decision-making model withgovernment intervention is constructed. A modified two-part tariff contract isproposed to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system and a sensitivity analysison the main parameters of the system is conducted. Finally, a numerical exampledemonstrates the conclusions.5. This paper studies the pricing and coordination mechanism of a dual-channelclosed-loop supply chain with the third party recycling under government intervention.First, two decentralized decision-making models with and without governmentintervention are constructed and compared. For the two models the wholesale price,retail price, recycling rate of waste products and profits are comparative analysed.Then, As a comparison standard, a centralized decision-making model withgovernment intervention is constructed. Two modified two-part tariff contracts areproposed to coordinate the manufacturer and retailer, the manufacturer and the thirdparty respectively. Finally, a sensitivity analysis on the main parameters of the systemis conducted and a numerical example is given.