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Research On Professional Behavior Game And Credit Evaluation For Constructors

Posted on:2015-05-06Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:H X YuanFull Text:PDF
GTID:1109330452470606Subject:Project management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the sustained and rapid development of construction industry, the healthyoperation of the credit system in construction market has caused widespread socialconcern in China. The professional misconducts of constructors not only increase themarket transaction costs, but also reduce the efficiency of resource allocation and willdestroy the normal market order. The supervision of constructors’ professionalmisconducts and professional credit is an urgent problem which should be solved asearly as possible. This dissertation focuses on constructors’ professional credit,analyzes the main evolutionary games among market players, and explores theinfluence factors of constructors’ professional behavior. And then the impacts on thereputation incentive and the compensation incentive for constructors’ professionalcredit strategies under the condition of credit evaluation are analyzed elaborately.Ultimately, it puts forward the credit evaluation index system and constructs creditevaluation models from the perspective of the “post-evaluation” and “processmanagement” based on gray fuzzy theory and credibility theory. The availability andoperability of credit evaluation is verified by empirical analysis. Thereby, the effectivesupervision of constructors’ credit from macro to micro levels can be achieved.Firstly, the dissertation explains the cause of conductors’ professionalmisconduct from an economic perspective. On the basis of that, the evolutionarygames of professional behaviors supervision to government regulators, project owners,construction enterprises and conductors are elaborated. The results show that moreprofessional misconducts are caused by government’s lack of punishment at the stageof registration. Government’s long-time incentives at practice stage can promoteconductors’ integrity. The probability of professional misconduct can be declined bystrengthening process management of construction enterprises and project owners.The above conclusions provide a theoretical basis to the intensification ofconstructors’ credit evaluation from the perspective of the “post-evaluation” and“process management”.Secondly, on the basis of reputation incentive model, the dissertation derives theequilibrium condition of reputation incentive effect. It explains the synergy ofreputation incentive and compensation incentive. The results show that the minimum standard reputation can enhance the level of constructors’ credit and improve theindustry reputation. After deducing the equilibrium conditions of practicing credit,this dissertation further analyzes the specific impacts and significance of reputationincentive. From the perspective of contractors and project owners, the dissertationconstructs compensation incentive model respectively. The research deduces theapplicable conditions, under which constructors’ choice of credit strategy can beinfluenced by compensation incentive and the optimal punishment in case incentivecompensation is invalid.Lastly, from the perspective of “process management”, the dissertation analyzesthe whole process on conductors’ professional behaviors, and establishes the creditevaluation model. In this way, a new perspective is provided to conductors’ creditevaluation and its management. On the basis of summarizing domestic and overseasliteratures, laws and regulations, the dissertation obtains the credit evaluation systemthrough lots of questionnaires and on-site interviews. Then, it constructs the creditevaluation model based on gray fuzzy theory from the perspective of the“post-evaluation”. The empirical results verify the operability of post-evaluationsystem. Learning from credibility theory, this dissertation builds the credit evaluationmodel from the perspective of the “process management”, the results shows that theprocess evaluation value’s influence to constructors’ payments or rewards can fullyarouse their practicing enthusiasm. Consequently, the realistic goal to control theirpracticing credit effectively can be achieved.
Keywords/Search Tags:Professional misconduct, Credit evaluation, Reputation incentive, Compensation incentive, Constructor
PDF Full Text Request
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