The Research On The Strategies Of Business Incubators And Venture Capital Companies Cooperation

In recent years, China’s science and technology business incubators flourish,science and technology business incubators have irreplaceable role in addressing thefinancial needs of the start-ups in the seed stage. However, with the continuousdevelopment of enterprises, increasing the demand for funds, it is difficult to meetthe growing needs of enterprise funds because of incubators’ restricted fundingsources. For a long time, lack of funds is an important factor in small and mediumenterprises development, incubators and venture capitalists cooperation caneffectively relieve start-ups’ bottlenecks in financing and promoting the developmentof start-ups shortcuts. Technology business incubator and venture capital researchcollaboration academia to become one of the hot issues of concern.From the technology business incubators, start-ups and venture capitalistscooperation policy decisions, this dissertation build the game model andcomprehensive in-depth study. The innovation of this dissertation in the followingareas:(1) Build a evolutionary game model of technology business incubators’financing decisions and venture capitalists’ strategy selection. From the perspective ofdynamic, we analyze the interaction mechanism between the different businessincubators’ strategy selection and different venture capitals’ strategy selection byusing evolutionary game theory and method. We demonstrated the incentive effect ofreputation and the constraint effect of supervision on different venture capital, anddiscussed how the reputation and supervision guide different venture capitals’ strategyselection. At last, some suggestions are offered for solving the problem about thecollusion between business incubator and entrepreneur.(2) Build a differential game model of technology business incubators anddynamic cooperation strategy research based on the reputation of incubation network.In the process of attracting venture capital, considering the incubator and start-ups’common effort in order to maintain the incubator network reputation. Withdifferential game theory, researching business incubators, start-ups’ optimal effortlevel under the conditions of competition and cooperation, and the optimal incomelevels of the entire incubation network. And then the feedback equilibrium outcomes in the three game structures are comparatively analyzed. The results show that, bothsides in coordinated cooperation game paid a higher level of effort, and the gains arehigher than the income of other games.(3) Study the cooperation of venture capital and start-ups with the differentialgame theory, and build a dynamic model of abstract differential game based on the“entrepreneurial chain’s reputation” which is a perspective of outside investors. Theincubator’s and entrepreneur’s optimal strategy in the Nash noncooperative game,Stackelberg leader-follower game and coordinated cooperative game was obtainedwith Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. And then the feedback equilibrium outcomesin the three game structures are comparatively analyzed. The results show that, thegains of coordinated cooperation game is higher than the other games. And themotivating factor of risk enterprise is a coordination and incentives of the wholesystem, can increase venture capitals’, start-ups’and the whole system’s income.(4) Explore the future trends of technology business incubator—virtualtechnology business incubator based on crowdsourcing. And investigate thecooperation model of venture capital and virtual business incubator. The virtual s&tincubator has the within meeting point with crowdsourcing model, and complementseach other to some extent, provides a new platform for the development of thecrowdsourcing model. A new operating model of the virtual s&t incubator based onthe crowdsourcing model was proposed.