The Study On Cooperation And Competition For Enterprise In Supply Chain Opertations

With the rapid developing of world economy, knowledge updating and science progressing provide the conditions for the market economy development, and also put forward the new problem. With the fierce market competition, the enterprise’s managers more profoundly realize that the construction and management is very important in enterprise development. Therefore, improving the efficiency of the resources in supply chain, strengthening the operation of supply chain management and reducing the economic loss in supply chain have become the important research direction of market competition. In such an environment, the enterprise managers actively seek the good method in practice to promote the healthy development in supply chain; and the researchers. on the theory try. to provide a solid theoretical foundation and effective method for solving the problem in the supply chain. This paper focuses on the cooperation and competition relationship between the competitions enterprises. This paper includes the complex relationship between participants in the supply chain and studies on that how do the participants establish and strengthen the supply chain management during the product life cycle. We hope that the enterprise have the better development.This paper is based on the current phenomena existing in the supply chain. We study the existing research achievements in theory and practice, and put forward the unresolved question on the basis of the management science methods. And the time shaft is the product life cycle. The specific problem as follows:(1) With the choice strategy of suppliers between the competition enterprises, this paper discusses how to select the optimal supplier. When the enterprises face the different suppliers, how do they choose the right supplier? When the different suppliers provide the same quality components, which is better? And when the components are different, who will be chose as the supplier? (2) Sometimes there is asymmetry information between the enterprise and the supplier. When the enterprise has no the supplier’s private information, what the enterprise will do. Does the enterprise use the incentive mechanism under complete information and incomplete information to indentify the suppliers? How does the enterprise use the principal-agent mode? (3) In order to ensure the product have a strong competitiveness in the market, the enterprise will research and improve the product constantly. Is it the right choice to outsource the research and development? If outsourcing the product research and development to competitors, it would make the technology leakage and increase the product similarity degree. How does it affect the enterprise’s ultimate interests? When the enterprises face the different methods to improve the product value, which will be the better choice? (4) Under the information sharing system in supply chain, how to prevent and avoid the information leakage problem happen? How to abate the motives of information leakage? Whether the competitor always accept the disclosed information or not? And there are more suppliers in the market, what will happen?This paper introduces the theory and method according to the research object and content for the supply chain problem. And it shows the related literature review about the research problem. On the basis of literature review, this paper solves the above scientific problems with different methods.Firstly, with the complete information, this paper discusses the supplier selection problem in supply chain. The competitor can supply the components that make the problem complicated. When the enterprises choose the supplier, they must consider the cooperation ship besides the cost and price. The paper studies the supplier selection problem starting with the static game model, and analyzes the problem under the situation which the suppliers supply the same component or different. The research shows that the cooperation between the competitive enterprises can reduce the competition and the enterprise cannot price the product exaggerative. But in some cases, even if the competitor has the lower cost and the higher quality components, the enterprise would choose the third party supplier instead of the competitor. With the above supplier selection problem, this paper considers the cooperation contract formulation process. And it tries to design the incentive mechanism to disclose the true information. The research shows that the enterprise can obtain the more surplus value through two stages of principal-agent incentive model. The enterprise will check the supplier when the audit brings the more revenue.Secondly, this paper also makes the related product development issues on the basis of supplier selection question. This paper considers that what is the enterprise’s optimal choice when enterprise faces the different strategies to improve product competitive in market such as R&D (research and development) or marketing. So this paper considers the decision model with the difference between the competitive products or no difference; and considers the game model for the optimal strategy in the saturated and unsaturated market. This paper shows that when the enterprise outsources the research work to the competitor, it increases the competition in the market as the difference of the product not obvious; where the total profit increases as the maximum use of the social resources. The enterprises will choose the different strategy when they face the choice to enhance the product competitiveness of the market in the saturated or unsaturated market.Finally, this paper considers the problem that with the incomplete information; the competitive enterprises forecast the demand of the market and decide the output. Under the revenue sharing contract model with the enterprise and the supplier, this paper discusses the problem and opportunities which the enterprises will face for the information leakage problem. This paper shows that the product quantity of the enterprise could affect the information leakage behavior of the supplier; In further that when there are more suppliers in the market, not only information leakage could weaken, but also the competitor could ignores the leaked information.