Study On Coordination Of Ordering Strategies In A Closed-loop Supply Chain Under Information Leakage

With the increasing of environmental pollution and resource shortage, the sustainable development of circular economy has been paid more attention to. As a mode of circular economy, closed loop supply chain makes the flow of production materials circular and makes natural resources get reasonable use.Thus, closed loop supply chain is of great significance for protects environmental, saves resources, and increases profit. Information leakage problems exist in various fields,especially in the closed-loop supply chain field. Information leakage problem has a great negative impact on corporation’s profits, which may hinder the normal operation of the closed-loop supply chain. So the coordination order strategy of closed-loop supply chain under the condition of information leakage may help close-loop supply chain partners to weaken the negative effects of information leakage. This thesis has done some research as follows.(1)Considering a closed-loop supply chain system consists of a single manufacturer and two competing retailers, who are responsible for recycling of waste products, and of which a retailer has private information of the uncertainty market information and the one doesn’t know the demand information. In order to gain more profits the manufacturer may be leaked the order information to the one who doesn’t know the information. This article has researched the optimal equilibrium strategy of the two retailers in the cases of information leakage. Furthermore,we analyzed the choice of the leakage behavior of the manufacturer under the revenue sharing contract.We find that manufacturer and retailers can be good cooperate under the appropriate revenue sharing contract mode.(2)Considering that the consumer’s willingness to pay new products and remanufactured products is different, this thesis has builded the close-loop supply chain based on the differentiation of WTP, which consists of a single manufacturer and two competing retailers. This article has researched the optimal equilibrium strategy of the two retailers in the cases of information leakage. And we also analyzed the choice of the leakage behavior of the manufacturer under the wholesale price contract. We find that the impact of the wholesale price contract on the manufacturer’s leakage is small, under high market demand situation the manufacture will leak the information, and otherwise, will not leak.