The Coal Mine Property Rights Structure And The Resource-Based Village Governance

China is a country being rich in mineral resources. The development and utilization of mineral resources are vital to achieving good governance of the society. Shan xi is relatively rich in coal reserves in China area, Resource advantage, as a "double-edged sword" is both for local economic and social development in Shan xi to lay the solid material foundation and forming the geological disasters, ecological destruction, increased the gap between rich and poor, intensified social contradictions of the resource curse. Previous government and scholars mainly focus on the economic benefit of coal resources development, resource utilization, production safety and profit distribution, but neglect coal mining caused by the negative externality of resources village heavier burden on farmers and village governance crisis intensified. The unique governance landscape of resource-based village is in urgent need for our study, in order to improve the predictability of the political and social risk.Paper takes the analysis framework of political economics, in the perspective of property rights of politics, using the method of empirical research, horizontal comparison, and type analysis, taking the three structures of coal mine property rights:state-owned property rights, collective property rights, individual property rights as a starting point, analyzing five typical resource-based village governance process and its performance of Shanxi. The period of this study is from the mid-1990 (village coal mine restructuring) until now. The time of mid-1990s is an important historical juncture. At that time, the township enterprises restructured in a large scale, so does the collective coal mine in the village. Two property rights structures are coming up. One is collective village coal mine management and personal contract property rights structure and the individual property rights structure of private buyout coal mines. This paper studies five resource-based villages’different development road in the process of coal property change caused by the different property rights and property rights structure, aiming to reveal the influence on village governance by property changes and leading to the change of farmers’interests.Full text in addition to the introduction and conclusion is divided into three chapters to form the paper, according to three kinds of property rights structure in coal mine (state-owned property rights, collective property rights, individual property rights) having influence on resources of village governance.The first chapter through two typical case analyses the relationship of state-owned property rights and village governance. The study found that village enterprise relational schema is close to village governance. When the elites of protection based village governance focus on the collective interests, give full play to the individual ability, negotiate reasonably with state-owned coal mine, and can provide the high-quality service for the development of the coal mine village, state-owned coal mine and villages can establish a win-win cooperation relationship, and relying on state-owned coal mines the village development gets appropriate support, promoting the village political, economic, cultural, social, ecological and all-round development; When existing the elites of profit based village governance, because of the lack of effective entrust-agent mechanism and the supervision the head of state-owned coal mine, the village governance elites will conspire with the head of state-owned coal mine of profit model village, aggressing the interests of the villagers, causing villagers petitioning, eventually making the village governance sink into dilemma.The second chapter through two typical case analyses the relationship of collective property rights and village governance. The study found that under the macro background of coal mine property rights system change, the key to effective operation structure of village collective property rights is the interaction between the guide of the elites of protection based village governance and the villagers’ democratic participation. On the other hand, if village governance elites become into the elites of profit based village governance, the village public authority becomes as its means of profit, the villagers’ democratic participation becomes a mere formality, the operation of collective property rights will be failure, damaging the interests of the villagers, leading to mass incidents, at last villages descent into chaos without the developmentThe third chapter is about the relations between individual property rights and village governance by analyzing a typical case. Compared with the state-owned property rights structure and collective property rights structure in the case, it found that the individual property of coal does not favor the village governance generally. Because of its possession and the use of private property, the mine owners could be take possession of the profit of whole coal production. The source of village public goods that be provided not from institutional constraints but the strong social responsibility consciousness of a corporate. The economy of this model of village collective is weak and the public products is not enough badly. The huge contrast between coal mine owner and poor villagers will not trigger the villagers, but it can exacerbate village class differentiation, lower village cohesion and increase the difficulty of the villagers’ collective action, making the village governance encountered serious challenges. Of course, if the company can undertake the social responsibility and provide more employment opportunities and more public goods for the villagers, the villages can delay the decline.The conclusion of this paper:Firstly, there are the close internal relations between the property rights structure and the village governance, but the property rights structure is not a fundamental factor in determining the governance model and governance performance. The governance state of resources-oriented village and governance performance is the result of the multiple variable interactions. The property rights structure could not only work unilaterally, even can not only work directly, but through the national willpower (system, policy and power), operator’s value preference and local aboriginality of social resources, etc. Secondly, the efficient and effective operation of the property rights structure is the foundation of good governance of resource-based village. Thirdly, compared with the state-owned property rights structure and individual property rights structure, the collective property rights structure is conductive to resource-based village governance.