The Strategic Military Decisions Made By The U.S. During The Korean War

The war on the Korean Peninsula (June 1950～July 1953) broke out with a complex historic background. Because of the intervention of UN forces manipulated by the US, the war was escalated to be one of the largest of worldwide nature after World War II. The course and results of the Korean War were to a large extent dominated by the US strategic military decisions. Main factors and contradictions that affected and constrained US military strategies include:it tried to contain expansion of the Soviet Union, its major enemy, while having to prevent occurrence of a global war that might be launched by the latter if provoked; it had to maintain Europe as the most important strategic focus, while trying hard to keep its "face" in the Korean Peninsula; it made a desperate effort to intervene in the Korean internal affairs in the name of "repelling invasion of an enemy" while endeavoring to unite the Korean Peninsula by force; it had to prevent China from sending its troops into Korea while ignoring the latter's fundamental interests; it wanted to take advantage of collective security system while having to unwillingly be restricted by its allies; it had to cater to anti-communist and anti-China demands at home while being obliged to refrain itself from war escalation; it wanted to see a truce while refusing to accept an ending without victory. By exploring the complex interactions of these contradictions, the dissertation tries to reproduce the decision-making scenario and process with respect to the US military strategy, to look into this decision-making mechanism and regular pattern, and finally to reveal its essence and significance.This dissertation is organized into three parts, the introduction, the main body composed of four chapters, and the conclusion.The introduction provides an overview of previous research works on the Korean War, explains reasons and academic values of choosing such a topic, and introduces the methodology and train of thought applied in this dissertation.The first chapter discusses the relationship between the NSC68 document and the US intervention into the Korean War. NSC68 published in April 1950 symbolized establishment of the US containment strategy. The document declared that, a defeat of free institutions anywhere around the world is a defeat of the whole world; to emphasize the sense of security is of paramount importance in forming allies; and a war helps create opportunities for military buildup and economic development. These viewpoints laid an ideological and theoretical foundation for the US to intervene in the Korean War. Because of its adjustment to the containment strategy and failure of the Chiang Kai-shek regime in mainland China, the US gradually expanded its Cold War coverage to include Asia. The many factors such as the tremendous political pressure on the US government due to the "lost China", rising importance of Japan in its Asian strategy, collision with the Soviet Union in so far as their Korean Peninsula policies, and of course its miscalculations made it a necessary choice for the US to intervene in the Korean War.The second chapter discusses proposal, deviation and establishment of the US'limited war policy, which is the most fundamental decision that determined progress of the entire war. In the beginning of the Korean War, the limited war policy was clearly proposed in the NSC73 series of documents. The miscalculations with respect to movements of the Soviet Union and China, the anti-communist atmosphere formed at home and abroad, improved situation of UN forces at battlefields and many other factors together paved the way for the US to make the decision to cross the 38th Parallel and to unite Korea by force, which is an important step leading to the escalation of war. The US'"neutralization of Taiwan" policy having brazenly invaded China's sovereignty, which, together with the security threat posed on China by UN forces marching toward the Yalu River, had forced China to send its troops into Korea to intervene. The UN forces suffered a heavy blow. MacArthur, unwilling to accept the defeat, repeatedly broke policy restrictions leading the US government to the verge of a full-scale war. Finally the US was forced to abandon the objective to unite Korea by force and established the limited war policy, because of limits of its military strenth, adherence to its strategic focus on Europe and objections of its major allies and some of Asian regimes's against the expansion of war.The third chapter discusses the decision of armistice negotiations and the military strategy corresponding to these negotiations by the Truman administration. The document coded NSC48/5 in May 1951 showed its determination to end the conflicts on the Korean Peninsula through political means. The negotiations started from July 1951. Capitalizing on its super military strength, the US couldn't accept an end with no victory; therefore they deliberately brought up troubles at the negotiation table. Since the unreasonable demand by the US on determination of the military demarcation line and its stubborn insistence on the principle of "voluntary repatriation" with respect to prisoners of war were refused by China, the war last one and a half year longer. The US refused a ceasefire during the negotiations, and launched ground attacks and continuous massive bombings hoping to force China and North Korean to compromise. Meanwhile, the US also sped up its assistance to the Republic of Korea to develop its own military strength with the purpose of making the forces of the Republic of Korea to be capable of more combat operations, which can be seen as the preparation for its withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula.The fourth chapter discusses how the Eisenhower government made the decision to end the Korean War. It solved two key problems:one was to take the opportunity appeared during exchange of sick and wounded POWs to finalize practically the policy of POWs repatriation, and an agreement on the issue of POWs was reached with both sides making concessions; the other was the removal of the most difficult obstacle to armistice inside the U.N. forces through solution of the problem that the government of Syngman Rhee objected and sabotaged the armistice by means of combining promises and menaces. In this way, possible major political and military crises between the US and the Republic of Korea were prevented. Furthermore, the US National Security Council also formulated a backup plan aiming at war escalation, upon which a major war can be launched in case the truce talks failed.The conlusion part mainly focuses on analysis and summary of the US'success and failure in its military strategy policy-making processes during the Korean War. The most serious mistake made was its excessive expansion of war objectives, demonstrated mainly on its policy of "neutralization of Taiwan", its decision to cross the 38th Parallel, and the principle of "voluntary repatriation" of POWs. Through the Korean War, the US achieved the three objectives, i.e. consolidation of its influence in Asia that was first put forward by Truman, promotion of its defense in Europe and large-scale expansion of its military strength, but it also paid a high price after the Korean War due to intrinsic conflicts of its containment strategy.