The Cognitive Analysis Of Objectivity Of Observation

The thesis of objectivity of observation is one of basic important issues in philosophy of science and scientific epistemology. The idea of theory-laden observation proposed by Hanson has shift foundationalism's ground and cast a doubt on objectivity. If a rational justification can be obtained, it will not only make a contribution to exploration on relation between observation and theory, but also have a significant impact on scientific knowledge. It is proposed that the justification for objectivity of observation be explored by the issue of whether observation is theory-neutral and mechanism of objectivity on the basic of research in cognitive science.The exploration of internal psychological mechanism in cognitive science makes it possible to shed light on the analysis for this question. The two important contrasting positions, those of Fodor and Churchland, concern whether continuity of observation with theory can be inferred from continuity of perception with cognition. It is illuminating that this philosophical question can be explored by taking into consideration on the empirical results and analytical tools in cognitive science.It is proposed that we can give an account of theoryrladen observation from the perspective of relation between perception and cognition. On one hand, the theories of perception demonstrate the internal mechanism of observation. Empirical evidences in cognitive psychology and neurosciences show that cognition can assist information processing of perception in different ways, which implies that cognition is penetrable. It is indicated that the perceptual mechanism can gives elaborate accounts and empirical supports for the thesis of theory-laden observation. On the other hand, from the prospective of neurocomputational approach and perception-based knowledge representation, it can be inferred that production and explanation of representation, which can satisfy constrains for cognition's penetrating, isn't an absolutely subjective-construction. The important epistemological consequence is that theory-laden observation will not necessarily lead to complete objection to objectivity of observation, if cognitive mechanism can offer constraints and adjusting.It is shown that experiment, measurement and inter-subjectivity of observation language can make contributions to objectivity of observation, while they are inevitably theory-laden. Then it is impossible to purport to a strong objectivity in light of theory-ladenness and error in observation. However, the inference from the theory of perception and representational mechanism of knowledge suggest that observation involve cognitive processes, such as representation, belief and attention. When they participate perceptual processing and satisfy corresponding cognitive constraints, we can obtain a cognitive justification for weak objectivity of observation with commitments on the minimalist naturalism.