Morrison's Views On China, 1897-1911

George Ernest Morrison's views on China underwent two significant changes between 1897 and 1911. One was from a pessimistic general view on China's future to an optimistic view after the Russian-Japanese War finished. The other was that his views on the Chinese political situation and foreign relations, especially on Chinese-British relations changed. Initially he held a firm anti-Russian view and wished Britain to use Japan against Russia; later however he held anti-Japanese views and advocated a close relationship between Britain and China. The changes in his views were influenced both by the changes in the Chinese social situation and international diplomatic environment, and by experiences such as his travels throughout China and his interaction with the Chinese people.The thesis has eight chapters. Chapter 1 describes his personality and early life experience and examines his first impressions of China. Morrison had a long journey along Yangtze River from Shanghai to Chongqing, then through Yunnan province into Burma from February to May 1894. This direct contact with China caused him to doubt those opinions and prejudices on China and Chinese that had influenced him before. Morrison pointed out that those opinions were untrue and unfair to Chinese in his book about the journey, called An Australian in China: being the narrative of a quiet journey across China to Burma. This book brought him to the attention of The Times. Much to his surprise, The Times employed him for his abilities shown in the book, and his dream of becoming a journalist finally came true. From then onwards his life was connected with China.Chapter 2 explains Morrison's observations of and response to Chinese politics between 1897 and 1900, based on his correspondence, British Chinese policy and the international relations environment of China during the time. Morrison insisted Britain should take part in Powers' fighting for interests while China was on the brink of disintegrating. In his view, on one hand Britain should stop any Russian invasion in North-East and North China because Russia represented the most serious competition to British interests in China; on the other hand Britain should include both areas of Yangtze River and Zhujiang River into its own sphere of influence. In the meantime, influenced by popular British ideas about China at that time, he held a pessimistic and indifferent view that China was backwards, corrupt, and hopeless, and that its officials had no intention to reform their government and society.Chapter 3 analyzes his views on China's politics and explores the impact of his ideas and activities on Chinese politics and foreign relations between 1900 and 1905. It focuses on Morrison's relationship with Chinese officials, and explains his idea of "using Japan to oppose Russia" under the background of international relations among China, Britain, Japan and Russia. After the Boxers' Uprising, Morrison insisted on his idea of "using Japan to oppose Russia" and even advocated a war between Japan and Russia because he thought the Russian influence in North-East China was a serious threat to British influence and interests in China and even in the whole of Asia. This worry made him sympathetic with China on the North-East China issues and he wanted China to be protected from disintegration. However, his sympathy for China was perhaps simply a result of his anti-Russia concerns. Even though it couldn't be denied that his activities supported China in solving North-East issues with Russia sometimes.Chapter 4 analyzes Morrison's views on China's Xinzheng Reform. Morrison based his views of China's Xinzheng Reform on his own investigation and observation. In his opinion, China wasn't a corrupt and collapsing Empire any more, but a country of vitality and progress with a bright future. He mainly described China's progress in his reports with little mention of existing problems in China, and praised the reform in order to maintain a good and progressive impression of China's Xinzheng Reform. It was clear that his optimistic view was honest, not pretended as Eiko Woodhouse pointed out in her research, even though it had very practical motives.Chapter 5 explains the differences of opinion regarding China's Xinzheng Reform between Morrison and The Times officials, and delves into Morrison's efforts in trying to persuade The Times. The Times agreed with the views of Chirol and Bland. Morrison's opinion differed from them in three aspects: firstly on Qing government's honesty in conducting the reform and its contents; secondly on Chinese officials' abilities and intention of reform; thirdly on British-Chinese relations. Morrison never gave up arguing with the foreign affair chief editors of The Times, and he made good use of his chances to express his optimistic views. But despite his efforts he didn't succeed in changing the ideas held by The Times.Chapter 6 analyzes the impact of Morrison's anti-Japanese views on his view of China and his idea of British China policy. In Morrison's opinion, Japan had become "the most dangerous competitor" of British interests in China after the Japanese-Russian War, so responding to this new situation, Britain should take active measures to protect British commercial interests in North-East China from Japanese exploitation. In order to protest against the Japanese invasion in North-East China and maintain that area as an open international market, not a special sphere of interests of Japan, Morrison thought Britain should instigate an "Open Door" policy in that area. Morrison's criticism of British tolerance of the Japanese invasion and his advocating an active British China policy had an impact on British public opinion and the foreign office.Chapter 7 analyzes Morrison's role in the Fakumann Railway Event from the perspectives of his view of China and Chinese-British relations, his advice and ideas on Chinese foreign policy based on his interaction with Chinese officials in the foreign office, and his influence in Chinese foreign relations. Morrison paid attention to the Fakumann Railway Event from the very beginning. He gave advice to Chinese foreign office officials on the event and published classified information about the event -obtained from his Chinese government friends - in The Times, to attract attention of other Powers. He also criticized Japan's policies in this event and Britain's indifferent reaction to it. His activities and reports, in which he was fighting for Chinese benefit, weren't as effective and influential as he expected, but they provided support for China to claim Fakumann railway rights in public opinion. Also his interaction with Chinese foreign office officials supported them to be firm with Japan during the talks.Chapter 8 studies Morrison's views on the spreading revolutionary thought and uprisings in different places throughout China to analyze his ideas on the Chinese situation before the Xinhai Revolution. In contrast with his sympathy for China's Xinzheng Reform, Morrison opposed the dissemination of revolutionary thought in China because he considered such thought to be a dangerous threat both to the reform and to the Qing government's rule. Compared with his optimistic view on the reform, he was pessimistic about revolution. Because of the fact that most revolutionary uprisings were being subdued by Qing army, Morrison thought the revolutionary party wasn't a real threat to the Qing government's rule. In general, he thought Chinese situation was optimistic and stable.In conclusion, Morrison's views on China reflected those Chinese things he saw in a comparatively correct way. His views changed with China's own reform and changes.