| Since it fled to Taiwan, the Kuomingtang (KMT) regime and its successors on that island have developed a multi-dimensional relationship with the United States, which ranges from cooperation and coordination to controversies and contradictions. A full-scale study of the controversies and contradictions between Taiwan authorities and the successive United States administrations from Truman to Clinton will surely shed a new light onto the solution of the so-called Taiwan issue.To put it briefly, US-Taiwan contradictions have been evolving along the following lines:The Truman Administration witnessed the most turbulent episodes in US relations with the KMT regime. Out of great disappointment with and resentment for the KMT regime, the Truman administration, by way of designing various schemes for Taiwan's"autonomy"or"independence", or even seeking a replacement for Chiang Kai-shek, endeavored to prevent Chiang Kai-shek and his followers from finding a sanctuary on Taiwan. And as the efforts failed, the Truman administration turned a much cold shoulder to Chiang by distancing itself away from Chiang and his regime in Taiwan. Even the breaking-out of the Korea War didn't change Truman's mind from adopting a kind of"an arm's length"policy toward the Taiwan authorities.The installment of Dwight D. Eisenhower into the White House helped to bring about a relatively smooth period in the US-Taiwan relationship. With the signing and taking-effect of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States and Taiwan formed a security alliance, relieving the Taiwan authorities of previous uneasiness and worries of being abandoned by the US side. Yet, controversies and contradictions persisted even with the alliance in place. This was especially true during the two successive"strait crisis's". While the Taiwan authorities was counting on the US to help it"recover the mainland"by force, the US side did whatever it could to avoid any direct confrontation with PRC. To ensure that, it tried its best to persuade or even press the Taiwan authorities to pull KMT forces out of the offshore islands, to realize ceasefire between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and to neutralize the Strait. This, in turn, generated resentment among the Taiwan authorities. On top of this, contradictions also occurred in other fields, such as how to make a proper use of American assistance, Chiang's arbitrary ruling, the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations and Mongolia's application to join UN.The Kennedy administration, like its predecessors, fell into heated quarrels with the Taiwan authorities over the latter's"counter-attack on the mainland"plans. Besides this, during this period, US-Taiwan controversies and contradictions also developed along three other separate lines: US attempts to adjust its China policy, US determination to replace its obsolete, working-no-longer strategy of"moratorium"on Chinese representation in the United Nations with a new one called the"important issue"formula, and again, Mongolia's application to enter UN.The Johnson administration inherited most of its foreign policies from J. F. Kennedy as well as its policies toward Taiwan. This led US-Taiwan contradictions to center around American attempts to adjust its China policy, American efforts to restrain Taiwan's"counter attack"plans, American plans to reduce assistance to Taiwan, and Chinese representation in the United Nations. However, while the framework of US-Taiwan contradictions was left almost untouched in this period, the subsistence did get deepened, both in the difficulty to compromise and in the fierceness of confrontation.Upon entry into 1970s, some new facets appeared in US-Taiwan relations, one of which being the evaporation of contradictions over Taiwan's"counter-attack"plans which had perplexed the United States and Taiwan for nearly two decades. In this period, the US-Taiwan contradictions took on a rather unitary look, that is, most contradictions were resulted from the reconciliation and normalization of Sino-American relations and the subsequent breaking of"diplomatic"relations between the United States and Taiwan.US-Taiwan relations entered a new stage in the Reagan administration. The furthering of US-Taiwan"substantial relations"led to the protruding of various contradictions previously covered up by US-Taiwan common cause of fighting against communist and PRC. Under the Reagan administration, US-Taiwan contradictions mostly focused on Taiwan's dissatisfaction with the Sino-US Communiquéto restrain US arms sales to Taiwan and the restraints US put on Taiwan's development of offensive weapons, US pressure on Taiwan to initiate"political reforms"characterized by so-called"political democratization", US demands for Taiwan to cut down its trade surplus, to open its market for American agricultural products and to protect American intellectual property rights.After Bill Clinton came into power in the United States, US-Taiwan contradictions were closely interconnected and logically coherent. Frustrated by Clinton's 1994 Taiwan policy review, which, in the Taiwan authorities'eyes, was far from being satisfactory, or even worse in some aspects, Lee Teng-hui decided to break the traveling restraints by joining a"re-union"at the Cornell University. This step cleared the way to the so-called"the third strait crisis"which startled the Clinton administration greatly. When the crisis subsided, the Clinton administration began to adopt a more balanced China policy, putting Sino-American relations back on the right track through promoting"comprehensive engagement"on the one hand, and leashing Taiwan's provocative behaviors on the other hand. Due to this, the United States and Taiwan confronted bitterly over the two Sino-American summits, Clinton's statement of"3 no's"in Shanghai, and Lee Teng-hui's clamor for a"two-state theory".Factors contributing to US-Taiwan contradictions are both internal and external. For the internal ones, the most significant should be the two parties'incongruous expectations for developing relations with the other. And for the external ones, they should be constituted of many, among which are the mainland government's American and Taiwan policies, the check of America's allies on its foreign policy, etc.US-Taiwan contradictions developed in two different scopes. In the scope of bilateral relations, the essence is that the US side wants to preside over the social and political developments in Taiwan and the Taiwan authorities, in turn, want to shake off US influence. The most intensive contradictions take place in another scope, the scope of cross-strait relations. In this aspect, US-Taiwan contradictions, which mainly evolve over the"One China"principle, have undergone a two-phased evolution. In the first phase, when Taiwan was under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek and his son, US-Taiwan contradictions was, at the core, whether there should be"one China"or"two Chinas". And in the second phase, when Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian held /is holding office in Taiwan, the core has shifted to how to create a"two-China"situation. Yet, in whichever stage, the United States and Taiwan have been fighting for the maintenance of the status quo or breaking it.Even though the evolution of US-Taiwan relations has been characterized by controversies and contradictions, both parties have huge stakes in bilateral relations, thus leaving them no choice but to carefully manage this relationship to prevent it from breaking down. For the American side, measures taken range from appeasement to pressure. In comparison, the Taiwan authorities have applied more sophisticated skills to manage its relations with the United States: manipulation of American domestic political systems, occasional threats against the US governments, and partial concessions to US demands.The study of US-Taiwan contradictions enlightens us that there are both challenges to and opportunities for the solution of the Taiwan issue. On the one hand, difficulties have been intensified and emergency has been highlighted; on the other hand, based on the full knowledge of the nature and generation of US-Taiwan contradictions, something can be done to wedge in the US-Taiwan relationship, to the benefits of the reunification of China.
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