From Representation To Action

Through the discussion of intentionality in the cognitive science and the analyses about representation intentionalism, interpretationism intentionalism and intentionalism of philosophy of action, this dissertation depicts the naturalism approaches of intentionality and discloses the defection about them. Based on the action of agent, we should unite nature and society. In other words, the implication of 'naturalism' should be developed from nature science to society science and humanities. We need 'wide naturalism' rather than 'narrow naturalism' in the discussion of intentionalityIn the middle of last century, the cognitive science was springing up and growing rapidly. Intentionality, a traditional topic in the philosophy of mind, was in the nature of things a core in the discussion of the cognitive science. Intentionality is property which mind direct at or about something. Cognitive science studies the relationship between the agent and the situation, so it reconciles with intentionality. Studying the interaction of the cognitive science, philosophy of mind and Intentionality, the article shows that the studies of intentionality should be in the cognitive science, and that the focuses are the important topic of the cognitive science.During the development of it, the cognitive science transformes from the first generation to the second, which the former emphasizes representation and the calculi of symbol but the latter thinks much of body and situated cognition. What is changed about Intentionality in this transformation? We study seriously Representation Intentionalism, Interpretationism Intentionalism and Intentionalism of Philosophy of Action in turn, showing the chang of intentioanlity and the transformatioan of the cognitive science are coincident. They are naturalism. Intentioanlity attach importance to representation and response to the world firstly, then stress situation and background of the agent. Not only do the mental state and the mental event calculate the representation, but also exchange information with situation actively. Background is indispensably a part of intentionality. It is necessary to study intentionality in the action and to unite nature and society through the action.In chapter one, the development of intentionality show us its focuses: the relationship between mind and real world. The cause of the controversy about intentionality is the confusion about intentionality and intensionality in the view of philosophy of language. It is possible and necessary to study intentionality in the cognitive science because the intentionality is the shared themes in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive science. Philosophy of mind offer basic concept and foundation of thought for the cognitive science. The cognitive science extend the scope of the philosophy of mind and intentionality.The themes of the chapter two are representation intentionalism which Fodor stand for. Analyzing Fodor's intentional realism, individualism, and naturalization of Intentionality in turn, I discuss his answers to the question of the intentionality, for example, is the folk psychology science, what is the relationship between intentional content and the world and how does the intentionality explain in terms of physical or non-mental words. Representation intentionalism conflict with the autonomy rule of the mind and can't dissolve the disjunctive problem.Interpretationism intentionalism is discussed in chapter three. After the introduction of his criticizing representation intentionalism, Dennett is charactized as a moderate realist. Intentional stance explain intentionality from the interpreter's view so that they can stand out the rationality of the agent. The theory is something of an instrumentalism.In the chapter four, intentionalism of philosophy of action is discussed. The foundation of it is biological naturalism. This idea exhibits the necessity the combination of intentioanlity and consciousness, which are production of nature evolution. With the analyses of action, we show that the self is indispensable to free action and that intentionality should be discussed in the first person point. The background, which is a part of action, is necessary condition to the intentionality of actor. The rationality about intentionalism of philosophy of action and the reason of the cognitive science transformation from the first generation to the second are argued by doing these.In the conclusion, we specify that the naturalization only in terms of nature science is insufficient. We can use the achievement of the cognitive science in the studies of Intentionality. Uniting nature and society based on the action, we enlarge the meaning of 'naturalism'.