Immanent Reference-A Theory Of Meaning Approached From Kant's Transcendental Philosophy

The author of the present dissertation proposes and argues for Immanent Reference, a theory of meaning, approached from Kant's transcendental philosophy, different from all the traditional ones, and due to be instantiated by the analysis of definite descriptions, proper names, and demonstratives respectively.To fulfill this task, however, the author has to first examine the traditional theories of meaning, explore the nature, origin, and status of the study of meaning in the context of the divergence between empiricism and rationalism, and point out the historical chain between empiricism and the traditional theories of meaning which often attach great importance to the relations between language and the world with regard to meaning.Then the author moves on to explore Kant's scientific metaphysics in terms of its motivation, purport, and implication, elaborating on the distinction between analytical judgment, synthetical judgment, and synthetical judgment a priori, between sensibility, understanding, and reason, and between subject, phenomenon, and object; contending that judgments could be reduced to analytical judgments, while pure forms of pure intuitions—space and time—could be reduced to space per se; and concluding that Kant's scientific metaphysics, as a critique of empiricism and of rationalism, has not only provided a convincing knowledge of metaphysics, but also provided a reasonable account of scientific knowledge.From this departure, the author approaches Immanent Reference with his proposal that Language is intuition, elucidates further the nature, evolvement, and representation of Language, making it possible for an enquiry into the construction, which has to be made possible through reason and thing-in-itself, of the object of knowledge, and into the forming of meaning or concept, and establishes the relationship between Language, knowledge, and meaning, thus leading to the criticism of the "embodied view of meaning" embodied in Cognitive Linguistics and of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.Finally, the author strives to instantiate Immanent Reference through the analysis of definite descriptions, proper names, and demonstratives respectively. As for definite descriptions, the author argues for a revision of K. Donnellan's definite description theory that definite descriptions be regarded as of attributive use and of referential use, the latter of which be further classified into definite use and deviational use, and thus proposes his cluster-model of Immanent Reference. As regards proper names, the author observes Kripke's historical-causal theory as well as its revisions, illustrates the origins of their weaknesses, and argues for the validity and explanatory adequacy of Immanent Reference as a starting point for a probe into proper names. In respect of demonstratives, the author approaches the philosophical question "Who am I?" from the "brain in the vat" thought experiments devised and demonstrated by D. Dennett and H. Putnam respectively, and claims that the flaws and faults underlying their experiments as well as arguments would lead to the failure of their enquiry. Accordingly, the author has the "brain in the vat" scenario revised to facilitate the investigation of the issue, arguing for the D-I-R (Defeasibility, Inaccessibility and Reducibility) of the referent of I and attempting for a possible solution to the question "Who am I?" from the perspective of physicalism.