| This dissertation is designed to do a Fregean study of the first-personal belief. Through the detailed discussions of Perry, Lewis and Stalnaker, there surfaces the contrast between Russellian and Fregean understanding of belief. Thereafter, the essence of belief (especially the first-personal belief) will be explored on a new level. The traditional Fregean belief theory holds the following two doctrines: (1) Belief is a relation between an animate subject and an abstract object which is called a proposition; (2) Propositions have truth-values, and their truth-values do not vary with time, place, or person. This traditional belief theory fails to explain the first-personal belief. The content of the first-personal belief is not to be characterized merely as a proposition. The truth-value of a sentence expressing the first-personal belief varies with time, place and person. Seeing that, Perry and Lewis attempted to revise the traditional Fregean theory in order to make it account for the first-personal belief. In the process, they proposed the new belief theories, which reveal a strong Russellian philosophy. Perry's theory contains singular propositions while Lewis recognizes relations of acquaintance in his theory. Compelling otherwise though it is, Russellian belief theory does not provide anything about what belief in nature is. In contrast, Stalnaker tried to defend Fregean belief theory, giving a philosophical analysis of proposition and constructing a propositional structure. Stalnaker proposed a theory of propositional concept, in which a diagonal proposition represents the content of the first-personal belief. In the two-dimensional theory of propositional concept, the first-personal belief is interpreted as established on meta-semantic facts. In essence, meta-semantic facts constitute what Frege means by sense. Meta-semantic facts can be used to account for Frege's sense, which is the focus of Frege's philosophy. As a consequence, a Fregean philosophy of belief is achieved.
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