| The evolution or change of Property Rights is to decrease transaction costs and increase economic efficiency. The rural reforms in china that began at 1978, which aimed at promoting agroland productivity, is in truce a process of institutional change that surrounds the rearranging of property rights to agroland. What is mainly characterized of represents that the government controls less or less of property rights, and the peasant regains more and more them, in other words, in no with the principal government makes attempt to arrange different institutions of property rights to agroland, as to the institutions of property rights to agroland controlled by government are transformed to be selected by agent peasant resorting to contract. In the course of the institutional change, it breaks through the binding of scarce arrangement in property rights to agroland that limiting agricultural growth, and originates the Contracting & Managing Contract (CMC) characterized of socialism fairity and efficiencity, otherwise the Dual-Layer Managing System (DLMS) based by it is spontaneously founded after inheriting the legacy of the People's Commune. However, the foundation of DLMS based on CMC would not indicate the end of the innovation, for the past developing of it for 20 years, DLMS is in the non-equilibrium of institution and need go to be improved further, in order to establish the ground of marketilizing agriculture and realizing socialism market-oriented system.As a cooperative managing system based on the holding of collective ownership and founding of house contracting & managing, DLMS can not settle once and for all the whole issues in agricultural growth. Since the agroland of DLMS is required for the function not only of economic output but also of social insurance, the highlight centering on increasing the income of peasant in reality is in one that the peasant wouldn't cultivate landfarming or relinquish their rights to contracting & managing, and in another that some peasants holding less land yearn for enlarging the area of arable land. What causes it lies in the less liquidity of agroland under CMC, but from the view of non-equilibrium of the institutional supply and demand, the defects what DLMS appears totally sum up it.The institutional non-equilibrium of DLMS in the final analysis belongs to the less efficiency of arranging scarcity of agroland resource. The major cause is that the liquidity of it is impeded, and it can be caused by economical, technological, or legal factors. The contents of this dissertation is logically written along it as follows:The introduction to economic analysis of property rights to agroland aims at explaining logical skeleton of dissertation with the theory of property rights belonging to New Institutional Economics.The subject of chapter 1 is that DLMS evolutes economically the property rights to agroland. This chapter consists of the explanation of marketilizing theory of property rights to agroland, the disintegration of People's Commune and foundation of Household Responsibility System (HRS) which the reforming of property rights to agroland results in, and the development of DLMS based on HRS, and reflects and comments on agricultural reform in china with the point of history.The chapter 2 argues the topic of elements of property rights to agroland in DLMS. After the definition of the property rights to agroland and expression of their functions, It has an emphasis on the features and factors of DLMS's structure of property rights to agroland, and the conclusion is that DLMS's typical outline can summarize the collective hold ownership and the houses obtain the Contracting & Managing Right, the property rights to agroland are made up of Absolute Property Rights (Ownership of Physical Objects) and Relative Property Rights (Contractual Obligations). Because the property rights to agroland in DLMS is typically characteristic of CMR, it is analyzed focally and argued that with dual significance of Fairity and Efficiencity presenting in the subjects and e...
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