A Game Analysis Of The Joint Operation Of Government And Enterprise In Continuous Time

Public-Private Partnership is a mode of joint operation of public infrastructure by government and enterprise(referred to as PPP mode).This thesis studies the following two issues of the joint and continuous operation of government and enterprise.(1)The cooperation model that obtains the most benefits under PPP mode.(2)How would enterprise maintain the cooperative PPP relationship with government.Based on the research of the cooperation and benefits of PPP mode,this thesis mainly cuts into the two assumptions under the circumstance of complete rationality and bounded rationality between both sides.(1)Under the assumption of complete rationality,with three modes of independent decision-making,government-led decision-making and collaborative cooperation in the process of PPP,what is the optimal effort of both government and enterprise,as well as the optimal return in each mode.(2)Under bounded rationality,in the process of PPP,what are the balanced strategies and benefits of both sides.(3)Under complete rationality and bounded rationality,what is the connection between government and enterprise during PPP.In terms of research methods,this thesis establishes(1)under complete rationality,static game model,Stackelberg game model and cooperative game model to construct an optimized solution,strategy and optimal return,with numerical simulation;(2)under bounded rationality,evolutionary game model to describe the behavioral preferences of government and enterprises.(3)Summarize the common conclusion of the complete rationality and bounded rationality by comparing equilibrium strategies and income levels.Based on the research on how to maintain the cooperative relationship of PPP,under the three modes of independent decision-making,government-led decision-making and collaborative cooperation,this thesis introduces government preference coefficient cut-off point to illustrate what is the controlled ratio scope of project income and public interest for enterprise,so that not to arouse any dissatisfaction of government.For research method,through simulated sample Functions Images,obtains the trend and key influencing factors of the demarcation point of the government preference coefficient.The research shows that(1)under the two rationality assumptions of PPP,the overall income performance of government,enterprise and society reaches the highest point under the mode of cooperative game,government-led decision-making and abalienated project benefits,which inspires the government to actively express cooperation intentions to enterprises and guide enterprises to maintain public welfare by abalienating project benefits.(2)The demarcation point of the government preference coefficient enlightens enterprises not to set a goal of maximizing their own interests,but to devote more efforts to the growth of public welfare to gain more favor from government.Through the comparison of the Functions Images of the demarcation point of the government preference coefficient,under the models of static game,Stackelberg game and cooperative game,it is concluded that the more powerful governmental control,the more relaxed relationship will exist between two parties,suggesting that if enterprises would like to ease the relationship with government,they could choose to abalienate the project control right to the government.