| The problem of rationality of science is an important task in the current philosophy of science. Generally speaking, this task contains two meanings: one is how the subject with the abilities of language and action obtains and exercises scientific knowledge; the other is whether the scientific knowledge obtained is reliable, namely, whether a statement rationally expresses the reliability of the knowledge it embodies. To sum up, this task is about the "discovery" and the "justification" of scientific knowledge. In the view of logical positivists, "discovery" and "justification" are separate. What they do as a rule is to analyze and to review the scientific knowledge already obtained, and to reconstruct the process of discovery of scientific knowledge by justification of scientific knowledge. This strategy of "Whiggish" "justification afterwards" fell under many animadversions, however it was Thomas Kuhn who really aroused the crisis of rationality of science. In his epoch-making The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn develops his view around "paradigm", and introduces the relativity of history and concept into the understanding of science, thereby breaks the separated state of "discovery" and "justification". On the groundwork of Kuhn, the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) brings dimensions of society, economy, politics and culture into the understanding of science as the determining elements, accordingly marches on more radically the problem of rationality of science.In the early years of the rise of SSK, namely 70s and 80s, the "Strong Programs" held by Edinburgh School make the biggest influence. The "Strong Programs" adopt the strategy of relativism to resolve the problem of rationality of science. They review many cases in the history of science in the same way as social anthropologists analyze the sociological cases, and try to find out those real reasons of so called "true" or "false" knowledge. They find that these reasons indispensably contain social, political and cultural elements, consequently they educe a strong cultural relativism conclusion that "different cultural situation leads to different rationality of science" . In the view of the author, although the position of relativism which the "Strong Programs" hold make an important step on the road of resolving the problem of rationality of science,owing to their supporting empiricism from the view of theory--the aim of the"Strong Programs" is trying to establish their theory as a kind of scientific knowledgeas a physical science--neither can they seek for a transandantal position to measuretheir practical norms, nor can they chain themselves to the inner norms of experience and lose their critical attitude. Therefore, they cannot find a proper perspective to justify themselves. The "Strong Programs" resolve the problem of "discovery" ofscientific knowledge, namely different context leads to different rationality of science, but it cannot make efficient "justification" for different rationality, consequently it still cannot resolve the problem of rationality of science.After the 80s, Paris School of SSK suddenly rose. Its "Laboratory Studies" program concerns the practice of producing process of scientific knowledge and its reflection. Practice, typically experiment, is more than just an appendage of theory. On the contrary, experimental practice independent of theory plays an important role in the development of science. The local laboratory site turns out to be the place where the empirical character of science is constructed through the experimenter' local, practical know-how. They demonstrate the idea of the " Strong Programs " of different rationality from a different point of view consequently. But the local knowledge which has different rationality can extended outside the laboratory not by generalization to universal laws, but by the adaptations of locally situated practices to new local contexts, that is, by the process of "standardization", not "generalization". The practice in laboratories contains no...
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