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Analysis On The Evolution Of China's Securities Market From The View Of Institutional Economics

Posted on:2005-04-25Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:D J ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:1116360125455133Subject:Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Recently, many scholars have made quite a lot of different levels of analysis and research on the security market in China; however, there is little research on the institutional evolution of security market. Even the current fruits made by such researchers as Hujizhi, Zhangyujun, Sheyunjiu, who have been studying on the institutional evolution of security market, lack of precise analysis demonstration or separate the theory from practice. This paper, based on absorbing and borrowing the research findings of Hujizhi as reference, try to give a more reasonable exploration to the evolution of security market in China.The key theory of this paper is that the evolution of security market is the process of dynamic game process among different interest subjects such as governments, enterprises and investors. The ambivalent movements of plan provision and market demand have constituted the original driving force of security market evolution. Based on this theory, by using the institutional analytical and historical analytical tools, the author described and analyzed the emergence of financing in stock market, demonstrating the evolution of security market in China as well as the problems such as environmental factors, evolutional route of increment creation and accumulation adjustment, evolutional trend of free market institution, and so on. In particular, the author demonstrated the driving force mechanism and inner mechanism of security market evolution. All the above problems are those that are not dealt with of not given a proper exploration in existing literatures, and thus are creative and make contributions to the current security market research.In addition to the guide part, the paper is divided into five chapters.The first chapter: Through analysis on multifactor economic environment, this paper expatiated the inevitability of the emergence of China security market under the gradually reform. On the precondition of social order duality theory of Hayek we defined the gradual reform as the continuously conflict and harmony between the inner and outer rules, and hold that the emergence of financing in security market is necessary with the sharpening of all kinds of conflicts in financial area. Among all the economic environment factors that lead to the emergence of China security market, the changes of saving and investment structures as well as the adjustment in industrial structure are the keys.The second chapter: The paper looked back the evolutional route of China security market and analyzed several important institutional evolution problems that the security market has experienced and is facing with. It has to be pointed that the applicability and feasibility of introduction of "market maker institution" into current China market is still under discussion. The inner-open of B stock market has more symbol purpose than its practical meaning.The third chapter: By analyzing the game behavior of different interest subjects, this paper demonstrated the inner mechanism and dynamic mechanism in China security market. This is the key part and also the most creative part in this paper. We hold that the security market of China has many born deficiency ever since its naissance, which lead to the lack of its function in resource allocation. The difference between the government institutional arrangement and the inner operation law of the security market is the institutional root of the function deficiency. The governmental potential hypothecation is a hard restrain condition for the evolution of China security market. Under the precondition of government potential hypothecation, the different interest subjects play dynamic games in the security market, displayed in the listed "hypo-excellent company" that has been made up and the practice of controllingprofit of the listed companies. The moving of the balance spot is the descending progress of made-up rent of the "hypo-excellent company" and the controlling profit of the listed companies. Because of the irrational behavior of the investors and the investment...
Keywords/Search Tags:Institutional Evolution, Governmental Potential Hypothecation, Planning Provision, Market Demand, Joint Operation of the Bank and the Security Company.
PDF Full Text Request
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