Seriously Equality

R.N.Dworkin proposed the theory on equality of resources in 1980s. This thesis is written in the logic of Dworkin's thought development. The author studies Dworkin's theory of equality about distributive justice, political equality, liberal community and the good life of liberalism.The emphasis on the political morality is a very important characteristic of Dworkin's theory, and especially that on moral principle is the strongest weapon of his theory. Dworkin asserts that a political community must show equal concern for the life of each person it governs . This is an abstract but fundamental egalitarian ideal that all theories of political morality will accept. Dworkin thinks this egalitarian ideal endows each person an abstract right of equality from which all kinds of concrete rights derive. By carefully analyzing, the author points out that Dwokin's theory of rights exists many ambiguous claims, his view about the abstract right of equality isn't so credible,Dworkin's account of equality of resources begins with the claim that all theories of political morality should accept as an abstract but fundamental requirement that all persons be treated with equal concern and respect .The theory on equality of resources presupposes two models including virtual auction and insurance markets to solve the problems of distributive justice during initial distribution and redistribution. Dworkin argues that a theory of distributive justice must be ambition-sensitive but endowment-insensitive. According to this view, the perfectly competitive market in economic theory, where economic agents are fully informed and perfectly rational, must be at the center of equality of resources. Dworkin claims that there is a deep and compelling theoretical connection between the market and equality . Dworkin emphasizes that an egalitarian theory of justice must recognize a principle of individual responsibility. People are responsible for the consequences of their choice about how to live their good life .The author asserts Ronald Dworkin doesn't successfully defend the use of the ideal market as a theoretical device for the theory of distributive justice and liberal political morality, because the perfectly competitive market of economic theory is a fiction.Dworkin refuses the conception of negative freedom and denies liberty is a independent political virtue. He thinks that a correct acceptable conception of libertywill protect not liberty as license but a set of concrete rights to particular freedom. Dworkin emphasizes: if we accept equality of resources as the best conception of distributional equality , liberty will not conflict with equality. The author thinks the equality of resources doesn't provide enough reasons for this conclusion because it is impossible to decide which is the true opportunity cost according to its own logic .Dworkin claims that the liberal community based on the equality of resources is the best answer for the idea of liberal equality. He argues that a liberalist can live a good life according to the principles provided by the equality of resources. The author asserts all persons must act according to principles of utilitarianism if accept Dworkin's theory. So his view is not true .The author discusses Dworkin's view about the objectivity of morality, and thinks Dworkin's theory fails to argue objectivity because he confuses the two conceptions of positivism and right objectivity.In the last chapter the author discusses several critical views about Dworkin's theory and agrees with Colin M .Macleond's standpoint.In conclusion, the author points out that Dworkin's most important insight is that an egalitarian theory of justice must recognize a principle of individual responsibility. How to develop the principle in political philosophy is our urgent task.