Interior Corporate Governance

Corporate governance has been widely drawn attention from more than twenty years ago around the world, while it engaged domestic attention just ten years ago. The system of research on corporate governance has not formed yet, but the influence and development of the field is out of imagination and corporate governance is vital to the fine development of stock market and the reformation of nation-owned enterprises in our country.Based on the systematic review of interior corporate governance theory, this dissertation researches the practice of interior corporate governance in China and conducts empirical analysis on the relationship between interior governance and performance, we also illustrate the related conclusion with three representative examples, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward in the end. This dissertation is divided into six chapters as follows.Chapter one is the preface that introduces the background and subject of the dissertation. We review the related theories and discuss the frame of corporate governance in order to outline the whole dissertation.In chapter two, we retrospect the research history and actualities of ownership structure accompanied by the necessary comment; the next section of this chapter is the study on the realities of ownership structure of Chinese listed companies. In the end, this chapter conducts empirical analysis on the relationship between operating performance and ownership structure with Chinese listed companies.Board of directors and governance effects is discussed in chapter three. Based on the review of the development study on board of directors, we compare the difference of the board of main countries in the world, and investigate the realities of the board of Chinese companies. We also provide empirical evidence for the relationship between operating performance and the board with Chinese listed companies.In chapter four, the author first give a brief introduction and comment on results of the incentive problem, which leads to an investigation onto the managerial incentive mechanism, and a systematic analysis, accompanied by an empirical analysis on listed companies, onto the reality and shortage about domestic nation-owned enterprise managers. Finally, the practice and problems of management buy-out (MBO), as a special incentive approach, is also discussed in this chapter.Chapter five is examples analysis. We illustrate the related conclusion on ownership, board and managerial incentive with three examples from Chinese listed companies.In last chapter, systematic advices are put forward on ownership structure optimization, board of directors, and incentive mechanism and so on.