Research On The Incentives Of The Insurance Intermediaries Principal-Agent Legal Institution

Asymmetric information theory is the core issue in the information economics. The questions occurred because of the information asymmetry and information incompletion among contractors during issuing and performing are the attractive fields for economic researchers.The insurance intermediaries principal-agent market is the typical market with the property of information asymmetry and information incompletion, which is with three forms of information problems: the moral hazard of the participants, the adverse selection of the participants, and the rent-seeking of the participants. These are the key problems to be solved.Based on the foregone research literatures and research results, some work has been done in this dissertation.From the behavioral economics, the institutional economics, the information economics, and the legal economics, the information problems in the insurance intermediaries principal-agent market are studied. The relationships among the information, the behavior, and the economic efficiency performance of the legal institution are found.Based on the civil law family, the common law family, and the legal institution of China, several aspects about the insurance intermediaries principal-agent legal institution are studied, including the definitions and the nature of principal part, the power-liability relationship, the liability undertaking because of breaching of faith. Suitable incentives mechanism should be established during both the enacting and the performing of the insurance intermediaries principal-agent legal institution.Break through the limitation of conventional theory of incentives, which only discuss the incentives problems produced by the principals to the agents, the behavioral selection of each one of the participants in the insurance intermediariesprincipal-agent market are studied from the economics. The feasible conditions and the realizable conditions of the incentives mechanism, which have effects on the efficiency performance of each one of the insurance intermediaries principal-agent participants, are derived.From the science of law and the economics, the effects on the efficiency performance of each one of the insurance intermediaries principal-agent participants by the insurance intermediaries principal-agent legal institution are studied. Effective supervision and incentives are important to the insurance intermediaries principal-agent law executors.From the behavioral economics and the information economics, the credit standing mechanism, as a supplement to the insurance intermediaries principal-agent legal institution, is studied. The credit standing mechanism has close relationship with the legal institution. They not only supplement each other but also influence each other. When establishing the insurance intermediaries principal-agent incentives mechanism, it should suitably make overall plans and take all factors into consideration about both the credit standing mechanism and insurance intermediaries principal-agent legal mechanism.The research contributions of this dissertation are significant to provide theory foundation for establishing the insurance intermediaries principal-agent incentives mechanism, including both the insurance intermediaries principal-agent legal institution and credit standing mechanism, with optimal social efficiency performance.