Economic Analysis Of China Financial Institutions Change

China financial institutions changes are different from those of developed countries, and also from those of new emerging ones and transition ones, with unique routes and operation rules. So, analyzing China financial institutions changes with political economy depends on both Marxism theory and western institutional research methods, but also on sticking to Chinese particularities, and to find a realistic way.The thesis is based on Marxist political economy's theory. I use the achievements of institutional economy and game theory. And deeply analyze institutions' forming and changes, and summarize the universal laws of institution changes. On this, the author studies China Financial Institutions changes and problems of reform in banking system, with the combination of Financial Institutions changes' particularities and China actual conditions.Under the frame of Marxist political economy, institutions (mainly the economic institutions) are governance tools of the ruling class. Their operation depends on country's power. The aim is maximizing the ruling class's interest. This thought is partially common with Norse etc. He also thinks one purpose of institution is to maximize the country's utility, but he has not realized the country is a tool of ruling class as well.On the other hand, some of the research methods of institutional theory are also useful. The New Institutional economists research institution changes with general equilibrium methods of classical economy. Actually, it is an important step to quantitative and modular research methods.In fact it is an important step to push the system study from qualitative analysis and scattered case analysis to the one of quantitative and model analyzing. Another new trend of international institution research is analyzing the balance between people, and the process of the balance to institution, with game theory. Comparing with the equilibrium analytical method, this method avoids the difficult quantization problem of general equilibrium methods. The game theory expands research range to a wide field from human economic behavior to institutions' forming and changes.The theory of interest group Beginning with Orson (1965,1982) contributes much too. It sums up the forming and changes of formal institutions as competing and balance of interest group for the first time. However, it is not obviously overall either. Because a formal rule ignored informal rules certainly will cause extensive violate and underground trading activity.Synthesizing former fruits, I am guide by Marxist political economy's key theory, and combine game theory and general equilibrium analytical methods, explain financial institutions forming and the lagging character of China Financial Institutions changes.Meanwhile, combining the theory of interest group and informal rules to study non-balanced of china financial institutions and profound reasons of financial reform' lag. In this way, Marxist political economy has offered the core direction. Especially the penetrating work of the classic Marxism authors on financial institutions and financial industry, provide powerful evidence of understanding China relationship financial institutions. And the general equilibrium analytical method and game theory have offered the concrete research approach to study different sides of Financial Institutions changes. The Author wants to synthetically use above-mentioned methods to understand China Financial Institutions changes issue better.The author finds, since Reform and Opening-up, China financial institutions is in non-balanced state for a long time. One of The straightforward representations is that the financial institutions changes can't be suitable for economic structure changes. Another is the financial demand of private economy can't be satisfied from the formal financial system. The origin of the unbalance lies in close relationships between state-owned economy and state-owned financial system. And the interest group activities during the period of post SOE may continue strengthening this kind of inefficient relationship financial institution arranging. So, the primary task of China financial reform should be to change these institutions, and promote the transition of the financial system.The issue of China Financial Institutions changes is too great to be discussed in one thesis. So the author chooses the relationship Financial Institutions as main subject, and as well as informal financial arranging and the development of capital market. The thesis structure is arranged in the order of question, analysis, and solution.Chapter one is introduction. The author emphasizes the necessity of political economy analysis of China Financial Institutions changes, and summarizes the classic Marxism authors' analysis on forming of Financial Institutions and the relationship between finance and economy. It is a preparative chapter for the other chapters of the thesis.The author sets up a theoretical foundation for analyzing Financial Institutions changes in Chapter two. He Focuses on the organic integration of game theory and interest group theory under the frame of general equilibrium. The third chapter discusses the theme of the thesis. The author analyzes the non-equilibrium character of china financial institutions, and points out that the primary representation of the character is the lag of formal financial institutions' changes and the expansion of informal financial system. Chapter four is an extension of chapter...