Selection Of Technological Innovation Model Based On The Perspective Of Firm Boundaries

The step of Global economic integration is fastening and the period of technical innovation is shortening after mankind moved into 21Century.Under die condition of competitive structure changed, the competitive focus is changing form product -based into technology of knowledge-based. Technical innovation is becoming an importance part of core capability. On the view of total country innovation system, Technical innovation is an importance part of country innovation system and way of improving economic growth. As we know that technical innovation is very meaningful, it not only affects industry structure and employment structure, but also decides country competence. Accounting strategic benefit of enterprise and country, the paper researches the selection of enterprise's technical innovation modes based on economic theory.Part 1 of the thesis discusses the concept and modes of technical innovation. Furthermore, brings forward the concept of this thesis, advances the concept of technical innovation's mode based on the firm boundary. That is external and internal mode.Part 2 of the thesis analyses the selection of technical innovation' modes which based on the transaction cost economics. Considers that the selection of technical innovation' modes is affected by technical characters. These include: 1) uncertainty. The more uncertainty is small, the more selection of internal mode is possibly. Otherwise, firm will prefer to select external mode.2) asset specificity. The more asset specificity is high, the more selection of internal mode is possibly.3) Hazard of Misappropriation. The more Hazard of Misappropriation is high, the more selection of internal mode is possibly. The analysis of this part brings the selective behavior of innovative mode into firm nature, and advances analysis further.Part 3 of the thesis analyses the selective behavior of technical innovation' mode which based on the classical game theory .The author analyses inter decision-making and the strategic equilibrium by the way of game models in different informational conditions. As a result, the author considers that this strategic equilibrium is net a effective equilibrium strategy on the view of social welfare. In order to solve this problem, it is necessarily to device a contract mechanism to protect the double win oa the process of selective behavior between two firms. On the other hand, different innovative mode faces underlying moral hazard which caused by asymmetric information. The author applies principal-agent model to study incentive-restrictive mechanism under different innovative mode. This study provides theoretic reference for enterprise to resolve principal-agent problem.Part 4 of the thesis analyses the selection of technical innovation's mode based oa the evolutionary game theory. .The author applies the simplest I-dimensional liner model to study firm longstanding foundational issues of equilibrium selection in the process of technical innovation's mode. And the author considers that the scale of participated population and original state have a decisive effect on strategy of...