| One of the most outstanding features of U.S. Taiwan policy during Kennedy and Johnson administrations is the dilemma on the choice between entrapments and support. U.S. Taiwan policy of this period is a multi-layered complex with intriguing structure and ever-changing content. Therefore, understanding the fundamental elements of the background, which shaped all the major characteristics and the evolution process of U.S. Taiwan policy of this period, is the basis for understanding this policy's true essence. The understanding on the fundamental elements of the background can be disintegrated into two aspects.First, the understanding should be based on evaluation over elements of structural background, which shaped that policy's multi-layered structure and formed its major trends. In terms of macroscopic perspective, the cold war pattern of power distribution and the capitalist system of world economy led by U.S., became the major external surroundings that confined and restricted U.S. Taiwan policy of this period, so the "rigidity" of cold war pattern of power distribution, and the "flexibility" of capitalist system of world economy, are the major structural elements shaping and forming the major content and characteristics of U.S. Taiwan policy in this period. In terms of microscopic perspective, the cognitive structure in the mutual psychological perceptions of the asymmetrical alliance between U.S. and Taiwan, is the important micro-structure defining U.S. Taiwan policy in this period, so the integrated and interacted process of mutual cognition, in which Cognitive Consistency and Cognitive Dissonance appeared in turn, becomes the micro structural elements shaping and forming U.S. policy of this period. In such a process, the psychology of "Grumbling Maid on Her Husband" emerged from Taiwan's cognition towards U.S., while the "Pygmalion Effect" appeared from U.S. cognition towards Taiwan, and its interaction and communication with Taiwan.Second, the understanding on the epoch background should be regarded as the other important aspect of understanding over elements of this policy's background. The epoch background has a far-reaching and profound influence on the trends and pace of evolution process of U.S. Taiwan policy in this period. The major content of the epoch background of this period is reflected on three aspects: the stalemate of division across the Taiwan Strait, which was formed during 1950s; the fixed pattern of triangular relation between Taiwan, mainland China, and U.S., which was shaped in 1960s; and the gradual change on Sino-American relation, which occurred from new trends of public opinion inside and outside U.S. calling for admit and contact on People's Republic of China, and which was formed in 1960s. The epoch background provides a panorama of scenario for further understanding and defining of U.S. Taiwan policy in this period.The U.S. Taiwan policy of this period, which was in a dilemma on the choice between entrapment and support, contains three layers: the macroscopic layer, the intermediate layer and the microscopic layer.From the perspective of macroscopic layer, Taiwan enjoyed a significant status in the external security strategy and external economic strategy of U.S. in this period, and U.S. was integrating Taiwan into its world-wide hegemonic system, so as to promote and protect U.S. strategic benefits. The significance of Taiwan in U.S. external security strategy can be understood from these two aspects. First, viewed from global level, Taiwan was one part of U.S. global strategic system of security alliances for cold war confrontation, in which Taiwan was an important outpost in the whole arrangement of U.S. plan containing China-Soviet bloc from two sides of Euro-Asia continent, and was also an important link in the whole chain of "forwarded area of West Pacific" and "Asia Periphery of Communism", on which U.S. put much emphasis for its containment strategy. Second, viewed from Asia-Pacific regional level, U.S.-Taiwan alliance was one of the pillars propping up the system of Asia-Pacific strategic alliances led and organized by U.S. In U.S. external economic strategy, Taiwan also enjoyed an important status. Taiwan was not only one of the major recipients accepting most shares of U.S. economic assistance, but also a model gaining most outstandingachievement under the support of U.S. economic assistance. In this period, U.S. not only actively promoted economic integration between U.S. and Taiwan, so as to lead Taiwan articulated into capitalist system of world economy, but also encouraged Taiwan to play an even more active role as a semi-periphery area in the "center-periphery" structure of world economy, which made Taiwan an strategic transfer station in the whole system of U.S. foreign assistance arrangement and world economy. But Nationalist government in Taiwan wanted to get rid of U.S. measures of entrapment, and develop its horizontal relations of union with other anti-communist allies inside system of Asia-Pacific alliances for its own wills and benefits, which violated U.S. general arrangement and wills. So viewed from the macroscopic layer, on the one hand U.S. must support Taiwan's Nationalist government for its strategic benefits, on the other hand U.S. had to trammel and entrap Nationalist government in Taiwan, so as to make it restored into established tracks and structures supervised by U.S. Therefore U.S. was often in a dilemma in its choice between entrapment and support.From the perspective of intermediate layer, the relation across the Taiwan Strait and the related issue of Taiwan's international status became an important aspect of the consideration by U.S. on its Taiwan policy. Although no fixed outcome had occurred on the relation across the Taiwan Strait, the reality that People's Republic of China firmly controlled Chinese mainland was now being accepted by the international community, and the international status of Nationalist regime in Taiwan was deteriorating bit by bit. Entrapped in Vietnam War, U.S. hoped to maintain not only the status quo of the Taiwan Strait, but also the status quo of Chinese representation issue in UN. Therefore U.S. continued its support to Nationalist regime in UN and its obstruction on Chinese Communist's entry into UN. But at the same time, U.S. had to take measures of entrapment so as to thwart Nationalist regime's stubborn insistence on "One-China" stand. In brief, on the issue of Chinese representation in UN, U.S. must fully protected and supported the international status of Nationalist regime, and at the same time entrapped and trammeled Nationalist regime, so as to make Nationalist regime accept U.S. arrangement and keep from taking unilateral measures which would damage U.S. interest. Thus U.S. again fell into the dilemma on the choice betweenentrapment and support. Besides, in order to maintain the status quo of fixed stalemate across the Taiwan Strait, U.S. firmly entrapped and thwarted the intention of counterattack of Nationalist regime so as to avoid Nationalist's damage on U.S. strategic interest.From the perspective of microscopic layer, U.S. clearly defined its fundamental positioning on the future trend of Taiwan's internal evolution. Taiwan's development into a national entity independent from mainland China shall be the trend most expected by U.S. and most beneficial to U.S. strategic interest. But Nationalist regime in this period still maintained heavy defense expenditure and a large land force, which severely extracted resources for Taiwan's economic development. Therefore, the fundamental objectives of U.S. related to Taiwan's internal development included such aspects as promoting Nationalist disarmament so as to concentrate its resources on economic development, and democratization and localization of Nationalist regime in Taiwan. In order to fulfill its positioning and fundamental objectives, Kennedy and Johnson administrations supported and led Nationalist regime by means of military and economic assistance. However, due to structural difference between strategic interests of Nationalist regime and that of U.S., Nationalist regime was reluctant to obey U.S. arrangement, but at the same time U.S. substantial support to Nationalist regime was crucial to Taiwan's social stability and development. In addition, U.S. policy-makers were reluctant to take strong measures to entrap Nationalist regime because it did not want its strategic intentions revealed and understood by outside world. So again a dilemma on the choice between entrapment and support emerged in the policy-making process of Kennedy and Johnson administrations.From macroscopic viewpoint of historic evolution, the dilemma on the choice between entrapment and support could find its origin from the structural rigidity in the cold war pat(?)ern of power distribution. The U.S. Taiwan policy during Kennedy and Johnson administrations did not receive apparent effect before the end of Johnson administration, but obtained substantial and designed effect in the period after Johnson administration, which met the expectations of policy designers of Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The positioning of future trend of Taiwan's internal evolution, which was set up by Kennedy and Johnson administrations, became theestablished track along which Taiwan's society evolved and changed. The fundamental objectives of these two administrations' Taiwan policy were mostly fulfilled and realized in the period after the end of Johnson administration. Therefore the U.S. Taiwan policy in this period set up the basic structure for U.S.-Taiwan relation and the evolution of Taiwan's society, and shall be regarded as rather effective.
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