Game Rule And Cooperation Order-Understand The Dilemma Of Collective Action

The enlightenment movement highlighted the value of subjectivity based on the atomic and self sufficient individual. It not only justified the"self-government"as the most legitimate ruling form, but also the priority of the civil rights to political power. However, first, because of the natural self-interested tendency and the possibility of doing evil with the instrumental rationality, we have to inquire how to realize the goal of"self-government"and avoid the"prisoners'dilemma"; Second, with the renaissance of public sphere, the boundary between private sphere and public sphere is becoming more and more obscure, and the arena of collective actions larger and larger, e.g. the arenas of cooperation beyond the executive regions and nation states has extended great, and the problems faced by collective actions has become more than ever before. So, the antithetic and balancing thinking can't handle all the problems today just by itself. Concerning the issues on publicity, not only function of the political power has to offer a public reason, but also does the expression of the individual rights because of the outside effect of individual behavior.The justification of the public reason is necessarily related to the understanding of morality. The dissertation is not to understand the present political world by constructing a moral order in a traditional way, but to shift the moral inquiry of"What's good political life?"to the moral-practical inquiry of"How to live a moral life?". That is to form the political virtues in political practice, to face the open and plural game world of politics and to find the way of constructing a cooperated political order of justice.The stance of finding and practicing political virtues by using practical reason not only reconstruct the indivisible relevance between politics and morality but also do well to avoid the imposition of the perfectionist and comprehensive doctrine on person's free will. In the disputable world of uncertainty, based on this thinking, this paper inquires into the question of how it is possible of the cooperative political order from the perspective of the rule of game. The rule of game is the balance of the cooperative order. The process of achieving the rule is about how to live a life under rule but not the rule itself. The goal is to construct the explanatory framework of understanding cooperative political order through the rule of game. To achieve this goal, the paper is logically divided into three parts and five chapters.The first part concerns the relevance between game rule and cooperative order in order to set the theoretical assumption of the explanatory framework. It's neither necessary to presume any value because it's going to impose the compulsive information on the free will, nor to presume the self-sufficient subject as"ideal observer", the"reflective equability"can also be achieved by"rational real person". And it's not necessary to presume the"veil of innocence", the"veil of uncertainty"based on the plural competition can also provide a framework of repetition game and pursue the"bottom consensus"from the perspective of reciprocity in the bargaining process of game. It can also create a system of game rule for the self subsistance and function from the perspective of internal regulation, and form and sustain the cooperative order by the balance of the institution from the game.The second part, which is the main part of the paper, is divided into three chapters.First, through the analysis of the field of the two-person game, the pessimistic view is that given that everybody is motivated by economical rationality, the"prisoner's dilemma"of non--cooperative game must be the inevitable result of it. Because, if everybody thought that he can achieve the maximum profit by using his or her complete capacity of rationality, then, the best tragedy in the whole process is betrayal. The optimistic view is that, based on the thinking of"private evil is public good", market-plan can resolve the dilemma of collective action, which unduly depends on smith's invisible-hand theory and hayek's spontaneous order theory. However, it forgets Smith's idea of including the self-interested man and morality and Hayek's idea of including both the inside rule and outside rule. And this is why we have to get back to the thoughts of them. We evaluate advantages and disadvantages of market-plan, clarify effect and limit of using rational choice theory to explain the cooperation dilemma of collective action, resolve the dilemma of non-cooperation game.Secondly, in order to resolve the dilemma of non-cooperation game, we analyze a three—persons game world, and try to understand why the cooperation is possible. In the acquaintance world, we can achieve the cooperation game through repetition game; while in the stranger world, we can achieve it through evolution game as long as the action is according to the real thinking. The third party of a three—persons game world not only include public power which is compulsory, but also include informal power which consists in custom,convention and history. Hobbes's plan points to a three—persons game world where formal power needs to be imported, however, through investigating exterior rule, so as to resolve the dilemma of who govern governor, we analyze the meaning of transition of political ideas which is from governor sovereignty to congress sovereignty and to popular sovereignty, and our discussion shifts from analyzing game of government power to pursuiting the moral base of state authority viz. finding the public will of the popular sovereignty through the practical reason. Putnam's plan is toward a three—persons game world where the third party belongs to informal power in social structure, and everyone must be affected by stimulus and punish of fame institution. And we articulated that in the condition of continuing tradition, all of the game rules achieved will be self-enforced. If game rule is self—enforced, so a cooperation order is enduring and stable. That we pursuit how to invest social capital is a key point because the trust system is available to achieve a cooperation order. So, in a three—person game world where we exceed our economic rationality, through our political reason or communicative rationality, we pursue why political cooperation order is possible, which needs that they provide public reason for both public power and citizen rights.Thirdly, for that a cooperation order in a three—persons game world maintains enduring, eventually it depends on the improvement of our moral rational, viz. on the practice of political virtue by the model of monologue in the ego game world. Nevertheless, our discussion of morality is not to say that everyone is a altruist, but that people can at least do no injury to other people; further, because our interaction is inevitable, the altruism can be helpful to cooperation surplus, too; and further, if everyone treats others from a good conscience, chooses to restrict selfish behavior according to moral rules, then it is helpful to maintain an enduring cooperation order. So, in an ego game world, we don't need an ideal observer as a self-sufficient individual, based on the practical and rational person, who possesses moral character, it not only reserves the necessity that everyone defies public power and express individual interests with citizen rights. According to moral evolution, we integrate rational ability with cooperation order, finally realized the subject politics of"self-government"In the third part, which is a conclusion, we investigate the effect of explanation and disadvantages of the explanatory framework. The most significant point of it is that it rethinks the political values with the perspective of reciprocity. The variation of people's attitude and manner, which is required by reciprocity, directly affects how to achieve self-government in real political arrangement. The process of achieving game rule is that how to belong to and obey the rule but not the rule itself. It is helpful to explain the subjective value from the inter--subjective perspective in the shifting from relationship contract to specification situation, the practicing of politics virtues with practical reason, the value of establishing game rule by free game and public participation. The investigation of how the game rule is self-enforced in the background of the history of evolution, promotes the comprehension of modern political values, and propels the evolution of modern political civilization. The explanation of cooperation order is very persuasive on how to maintain and consolidate political order in the national and international fields. We compare political process with economic process, analyze political process, and the analysis is helpful to accurately locate government and define government role, and distinguish between government power and state authority. In the level of interest game, we achieve institutional equilibrium through interchange,interaction,compensation and compromise; in the level of social ethics, the governance of ethic community is helpful to compensate the deficit of governmental and market governance; further, in the level of norm, because the world empire or eternal peace are not real but dreams, based on the spirit that"the world is for everyone"and"everyone is for the world", only the way of participating the governance of world community is the key to achieve a cooperation order in further collective action. The disadvantage of the paper lies in the fact that we only analyze the possibility of a cooperation order, because the necessity of a cooperation order is too complicated that we are not able to specifically explain it. Facing the reality of a n-persons game world, the possible equilibrium is not only one but can head in different directions, which may disappoint those who pursue the certain equilibrium of cooperation. What we pursue is only that we make direction helpful to achieve rule, the game rule is the process of achieving the rule, but not the rule itself. Nevertheless, the scholars who entirely compare it with the evolution of creatures propose the doubt that whether the choice of our institution is outcome of our independent invention or just preordained. In other word, to what extent do we decide destiny of our institution? Or, to what extent does the outcome of the institution which we have seen reflect a kind of further intrinsic biological tendency? Indeed it is a very complicated question, although we don't give a very good explanation, we don't neglect the function of our rational choice in game play in which we practice.