The World Market And Domestic Conflict Governance

This dissertation focuses on the internal conflicts that late development countries tend to encounter during their process of industrialization. The main theme is about how will the world market reshape late developing countries'internal political order? How do the emerging industrialized countries safeguard internal political and social stability in the interaction between inside and outside circumstances?The dissertation argues that late development countries are placed at certain stages in the global power hierarchy and need to promote its own industrial competitiveness through state power. During this process, the power distribution at home and abroad determines the nature of internal conflicts. Modern political violence is inherent within the fact that market is the basic institution for resource distribution. The expansion of market is not only some kind of economic motivation, but also that of potential political motivation. As a sort of game rules, market plays a dual role in the process of latedevelopment countries'expansion process. On the one hand, market dissolves the identity problem of bargainers, and encourages the rise of inherent demand for equal and free interactions within the heart of transactors. On the other hand, market produces the new kind of power distribution, which might give birth to new kind of unfairness and compulsion.Based on the above-mentioned analysis, the dissertation puts forward some necessary conditions for political violence, studying political, social and economic issues under the single perspective of power analysis. The thesis maintains that power is some kind of positive transactions, that is to afford some goods in return of interference against object actions, while violence is kind of negative transactions, that is to achieve political purposes through violence or threats of force. Violence only exists where power is useless. Here, the article coins a new concept: the dilemma of transaction-impossible. The dilemma of transaction-impossible is necessary but not ample conditions for political violence. The thesis holds the view that the abuse of political, economic and social powers engenders the"rent". When the rent is oriented towards infinity, the transaction-impossible phenomenon among transactors rises, and as a result, some of the transactors can't participate in the games any more. Under this circumstance, violence is the main channel for transactors to take part in the political and economic transaction greatly. Politically, the transaction-impossible among big groups will lead to insurgency and revolution, while the transaction-impossible between big group and small group will lead to separatism, insurgency and terrorism, etc.The thesis also analyses the ample conditions for political violence, and argues that late development countries should strengthen the competitiveness of internal strategic industries through political maneuver. Only through this, can the post-developing countries garner enough rents from certain groups at home and abroad, make use of the rents and push forward the development of country's strategic industries. All these pose difficulties for the country to maintain fairness and equality at certain development stage, and bring forth tensions among state, international player and various interest groups at home. Under the circumstances of world economic turbulence, this tension might evolve into relatively massive wave of political violence. The intensity and gravity of violence depend on various modes of domestic power distribution, impacts of the crisis and the relationship between the state and outside world.The thesis conducts comparative case study about Philippine, South Korea, Mexico and Brazil. The difference of their development performance and internal conflicts is derived from their different status at power structure. The formation of this power structure depends on the power relationship among state, domestic strata and the heartland of international systems. In Philippine, the reciprocal relationship between land-oligarchs and world markets impedes domestic industrial development and pricks up internal conflicts. South Korea was at the forefront of cold war, thus won great support from outside countries. South Korea settled the complex issue of land ownership under the outside force, and promoted the development of strategic industries in a mode of cohesive-capitalist states. In the end, South Korea made good use of international power structure and realized industrialization successfully. As to the Mexico, though it has settled the land issue basically, it plunged into chaos again after long-term stability. The reason is that in the process of melting into world market, domestic interest groups developed various kinds of relationships with outside markets, which brought out different interest appeal, and led to transaction-impossible among various strata's interests. In the end, the revolutionary system party who governed the state for 70 years stepped down and farmers'revolutionary broke out. In Brazil, due to the existence of landlordism at the initial stage of industrialization and the concomitant dependent-development mode, the political relationship among land-oligarchs, emerging industrial strata and social masses was unstable. As a result, the development performance and domestic political turbulence co-existed.The status of one country in the international power hierarchy and the power relationship among various domestic strata are significant. They determined the quantity of resources one country can gain from outside, the mode and settlement of internal conflicts, and the development path of concerned country. In history, due to their domestic industries'dominant role in the world, US and Britain can obtain enough rents from world markets to mitigate internal conflicts. While other countries, like Japan and Germany, though boasted of certain industry basis, their ways to gain outside resources through market means is constrained. The interest conflicts among land-oligarchs, industry-oligarchs and workers and farmers are nonnegotiable and lead to the dilemma of transaction-impossible. Therefore, the country has to militarize the state and grab resources from outside forcibly, in order to mitigate internal conflicts and achieve equal interest distribution at home. As to those countries within which farmers are the main body, like Russia and China, their bourgeois classes are small and weak, and these countries are placed at the bottom of global political and economic power hierarchy generally. China and Russia established powerful regimes through revolution and mitigate the dilemma of transaction-impossible through government authority. After the establishment of regimes, they extract surplus from agriculture and invest them in the industrial development, ushering in new modes of industrialization. Moreover, China is different from Soviet Union and pioneered a path that state incubates society. In the Chinese mode, the state first established the self-dependent development basis by breaking away from the global market systems, then ushered in market mechanisms, and at last developed the scientific people-first development mode.In conclusion, the thesis puts forwards some solvents for late development countries'internal conflicts. The article points out that political system calls for mitigation of the dilemma of internal transaction-impossible, so as to safeguard the go-on process of political transaction. All these demand suitable adjustment of the relationship between domestic market and global market, smoothen relationship among various strata, different regions and world market by ways of industry upgrade and macro-management, balance various interest groups, and establish power equilibrium systems while propping up strategic industries. Only through this, can the late development countries mitigate massive internal conflicts during their way of industrialization.