The Research Of The Follow-up Supervision Of Administrative License

Administrative license,as a means of government control,is "the government executive bodies in the framework of market mechanisms,in order to correct market failures,based on the laws of the market,as well as the main economic activity accompanied by their economic activities and social issues arising from the micro level intervention and control activities. The introduction of "Chinese Administrative License Law" leads many administrative license regulatory authorities recognize that the scope of administrative license includes not only access to the regulatory aspects of administrative license,but also include the follow-up supervision. This article is based on the various issues that arise after the implementation of "Chinese Administrative License Law" .In order to provide system solutions,author specifically make in-depth analysis and reflection with the general principles of administrative law from the balanced information perspective.Since the power of the follow-up supervision of the administrative license is the foundation of making the follow-up supervision of the administrative license system, therefore,first of all,Author launched a study of the follow-up supervision power of the administrative license. Author believe that follow-up supervision of the administrative license has the characteristics of "acquaintance" background, neutrality and linear features and other. The fundamental difference between the power of the access regulation of administrative license and the power of the follow-up supervision of the administrative license grants the irreplaceability of follow-up supervision,and the dialectical relation between the access supervision and the follow-up supervision is that the access supervision is the object screening mechanism of the follow-up supervision and the follow-up supervision is the guarantee mechanism of the value of the access supervision,and the follow-up supervision of administrative license from the macro and micro level in the administrative license access counterproductive regulation play to enhance security and access for monitoring the performance of administrative license functions. Based on the basic theory research,author research some problems of the Chinese administrative license and its impact on the state of the asymmetric information. Through research,author believe that follow-up monitoring problems of Chinese administrative license system mainly consist in the regulatory body of the set level,the supervision of law enforcement and regulatory aspects of legal responsibility. The existence of these problems of follow-up supervision of the administrative license law relationship between the main body of information state constitutes a significant impact, making administrative license holder's information superiority status become even more prominent. Based on the administrative license holders of opportunistic behavior of the study of logic,author believe that administrative license holders in the state of information superiority by the performance of an unlawful state dishonesty is a tendency of opportunistic behavior. It is due to various objective and subjective conditions,the administrative license regulatory authorities and the public can not receive full and timely information of the implementation of administrative license from the administrative license holders,therefore,in specific circumstances,the administrative license holders may use a more favorable information superiority to gain improper personal benefit. Based on the balanced information perspective,author proposed the solution to improve follow-up monitoring of Chinese administrative license system envisaged in the path. First,government information publicity is the balanced information mechanism.In order to increase the amount of information for making decision and ease the information status,author think the focus of follow-up supervision of administrative license system is not only to emphasize that information inferior side should take own actions , but also to build information superiority's information disclosure system. As the main obligations of the mandatory information disclosure system,open system of government information by its very nature is a realization of the public right to know,the right to relieve information asymmetry state between the public authorities and the public.The extent of information disclosure of government regulation directly determines the amount of information acquisition of information underdog,directly affects the state of information asymmetry between the public , administrative license agencies , and administrative license holder. In order to improve Chinese administrative license government information publicity,author put forward to set the scientific regulatory body, to build the administrative license regulatory information-sharing mechanisms , to accelerate the building of e-government,to establish "blacklist" system,to improve the due process of administrative law. Second,author study the mandatory information disclosure mechanism of the administrative license holder.Despite the implementation of the government information disclosure system can increase the information to the whole community,author believe that in order to fundamentally ease the problems of information asymmetry between the body of the administrative license regulation legal relationship, relying on the government supply mechanism singly is far from sufficient to achieve a good follow-up supervision of the administrative license also need to create new regulatory mechanisms for information supply. Based on this,from a balanced point of view,author think it is inevitable to establish administrative license holder mandatory information disclosure mechanism. author study the value of mandatory information disclosure system,the principle of establishment,the reference element,etc. and especially put forward that setting mandatory information disclosure mechanism need to make reference to the cost of searching information,the cost of disclosing information,the degree of specialization and market competition.Third,author study the social balanced mechanism of information that is public participation in regulatory mechanism. Public participation in democracy is an important mechanism.It is good to the balanced information goals of the follow-up supervision of the administrative license. To this end,On the basis of studying the value of public participation to the follow-up supervision of the administrative license, author carry out an analysis of existing problems and put forward some ideas,for example,fostering a sense of civic awareness,improving the regulatory impact assessment system,and improving the reporting reward system.