On Japan's Principle Of "Separation Between Politics And Economy" In Dealing With China

"Cold politics, hot economics"is the most frequently used catchphrasefor both the Chinese researchers and media to characterize the basic featuresand development of current China‐Japan relations. The mainstream definitionobviously indicates the China‐Japan relations are yet to get truly normalizedor friendly nearly 40 years after the two countries established formaldiplomatic relations. To sort out the historical reasons for that abnormalscenario, the writer holds that it is necessary to conduct a strict empiricalstudy of the China‐Japan relations before the two countries announced tonormalize their relations in 1972, especially since the World War II.Since 1952, when Japanese and Republic of China governments signed aformal peace treaty, to 1972, when China and Japan announced to normalizerelations, the Chinese government had never ceased to advocate friendlyrelations between the Japanese and Chinese people and expressed its hope forestablishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries assoon as possible. The Japanese cabinet, however, had stuck to the principle of"separation between politics snd economy"in dealing with China, whichrefers to its stance of developing private economic and trade relations withChina while shelving political exchanges with the Chinese government. TheJapanese principle of"separation between politics snd economy"since theWorld War II had largely experienced such a development trajectory: It cameinto being during the Shigeru Yoshida government, developed during theHatoyama Ichiro government, was bogged down in predicament during theKishi Nobusuke government, was restored during the Ikeda Hayato government, was at a low ebb again during the SatōEisaku government andcame to an end during the Tanaka Kakuei government.The Japanese administrations all acknowledged the importance ofChina‐Japan trade for the Japanese economy and expressed their hope that itis necessary to develop private economic and trade relations with China.However, no administrations had pushed private economic and tradeexchanges with China for the purpose of normalizing bilateral"political"relations or dared to go one step beyond the bounds prescribed by the UnitedStates and Taiwan. Even the improvement in bilateral relations as a result ofefforts made by Hatoyama Ichiro and Ikeda Hayato is at best a limited stepforward in private economic exchanges under the shadow of the"separationbetween politics snd economy"principle, let alone the country's politicalconspiracy of achieving"two Chinas". Even if the Tanaka Kakuei governmentrealized normalization of bilateral relations, it is but a follow‐up step after theUnited States and it is not normalization of bilateral relations in the real sense.The Chinese government has never seriously accepted and recognizedsuch principle of"separation between politics snd economy". It insists thatthe two cannot be separated in its Japan policies. Meanwhile, hoping that theChinese and Japanese people could get friendly, it has adopted a series ofgradualist policies to promote ultimate normalization of bilateral relations,such as"private exchanges go first","private exchanges promoting officialexchanges"and"government support". In the later years of the SatōEisakuadministration, the Chinese government has strictly taken"Three PoliticalPrinciples"and"Inseparable Politics and Economics"as the political basis forbilateral exchanges and precondition for any negotiations. From the foundingof the new republic to the normalization of the China‐Japan relations, China'sattitude towards Japan had been determined by multiple factors, such as theimplementation of Japan's"separation between politics snd economy" principle, China's domestic political environment and changes in internationalsituation.Although it was formed during the Shigeru Yoshida administration, the"separation between politics snd economy"principle was not purposefullydesigned by Shigeru Yoshida or any other politician, but a natural outcome ofthe cold war regime in the post‐war era, which influenced Japan's Chinapolicies. Moreover, the implementation of the principle is also directly subjectto influence of international political environment, especially the China‐USrelations. Therefore, when the China‐US relations ease, the United Stateswould require Japan to give limited maneuvering space to theimplementation of the principle so long as it would affect theJapan‐US‐Taiwan alliance; when the China‐US relations sour, the UnitedStates would strictly require the Japan to abide by the principle and theChina‐Japan relations would encounter difficulties. The principle had comeinto being as a result of the emergence of the US'East Asia cold‐war strategyto contain China, eased following the thawing of international and East Asiacold‐war situation and finally come to an end as China‐US relations eased.The principle, which goes against basic principles of political economicsand sacrifices China's national interest, has continued for as long as 20 years,because, apart from constraint of the Japan‐US‐Taiwan alliance, it issupported domestically in Japan. Those Japanese people and organizationsthat support friendly exchanges with China can be divided into two groups.One includes those non‐political figures who have strong expectationstowards developing the Chinese market and organizations that have beenformed for the purpose of doing business with China. They aim to developtrade with China and do not care much about bilateral political relations.After China put forward the three principles as preconditions for China‐Japantrade, although their trade activities may promote friendly exchanges between the two countries, their motives remained targeted at economicbenefits until the change in international situation and the thawing ofChina‐US relations. The other group includes those from the Japanese cabinetor those who are friendly to China and have direct or indirect relationshipwith the Japanese government as well as organizations under their leadership.Their effort and leadership have led to the signing of the fournon‐government agreements in the post‐war era between China and Japanand the Memorandum on Comprehensive Trade between Japan and China.Seen from the background, process and outcome of the signing of thoseagreements, those China‐friendly people all failed to break the principle of"separation between politics snd economy"; instead, they had abided by theprinciple. Their friendliness has a precondition: Not going against Japan'sChina policies. Therefore, it is hard for the Japanese people, who have alreadyhad a sense of the principle, to push the government to change that principle.Although the principle as a temporary strategy can in a period of timehelp maintain balance between Japan, the United States, Taiwan and theChinese mainland and to an extent ensure the Japanese governments wouldnot conflict with those private figures and organizations that advocated tradewith China, the history has proved that with that principle in place, the spacefor non‐official exchanges between the two countries is very limited and suchexchanges are subject to the influence of changing political factors. Withoutestablishment of sound and smooth bilateral state‐level relations, it is hard forprivate exchanges to fare well or even achieve substantial results. Theprinciple of"separation between politics snd economy"cannot serve as abasis for state‐to‐state relations between the two countries.The normalization of China‐Japan relations during the Tanaka Kakueigovernment puts an end to the principle of"separation between politics sndeconomy", which had been adopted since the end of the World War II and bilateral relations have since featured normal political and economic relations.However, the normalization of the bilateral relations is yet to solve all thepolitical problems between the two countries. Those problems are the directcause of the"cold politics"scenario of China‐Japan political relations sincenormalization of bilateral relations until today.