| Rent-seeking is not merely concerned by Chinese government and all social classes. Rather, it is also the difficulties some other countries must face to. Public power rent-seeking is recognized to be abuse of power and position by government officials who choose to seek illegitimate private gain. That is to say, the concept of rent-seeking has been applied to corruption generally.Rent-seeking theory, Principle-Agent Theory and many correlative materials information which suggest the substance of public rent-seeking is abuse of power, while the origin is systematic loopholes. Therefore, under different institutional system, it can be distinguished from public rent-seeking behavior by individual public officials and the level of rent-seeking of the whole public officials in different localities. This paper is based on previous viewpoints and achievements that provide a research foundation.Most materials information focuses on rent-seeking in the international comparison, but not refers to rent-seeking in different regions in the same country. Therefore, considering in reality, this paper analyze domestic effect factors of rent-seeking and discrepancy of different regions to discover domestic law of rent-seeking, and to formulate anti-corruption policy which provided a pointed theoretical basis.The innovations of this paper are:(1)Putting forward rent-seeking in the Hierarchical Agency and study rent-seeking of public officials from the right respondents. This is a new visual of research. Available researches examine the matter from agent including what actions may country and government take to restrain rent-seeking or corruption are in the traditional Principal-Agent Theory. These researches neglected the role of the right respondents into rent-seeking and assumption conditions are too rigid, as a result, it cannot grasp accurately of the Formation Mechanism. Following to tax collection and management, this paper analyze conspiratorial and extortive rent-seeking formation mechanism through co-ordinated efforts by the right holders and the right respondents.(2)This paper is designed along both main routes to analyze origin of rent-seeking, which fully reflects the combination of micro- and macro- analysis. Institutional economics provide the result of individual under intuitional environment on the basis of cost and revenue. Consequently, it defectively influences pay and punishment to the right holders from a microscopic perspective, while to the right respondents are the operation of power (which determines benefits) and rights cost. These factors are influenced more or less by the macroscopic perspective. Unlike available researches, this paper has been in a position of the institutional factors to the influence of rent-seeking, which isn't as if former researches of the effect of rent-seeking disparities of formal system to see from other countries but to consider how the discrepancy of enforcement effect leads to disparities of different regions of rent-seeking in the unitary system countries.(3)In the process of Quantitative Analysis, this paper does not follow the mode of traditional Hypothesis testing, but to make a list of the possible effect factors which are 5 categories and 23 factors to the level of rent-seeking in different localities on the basis of theory. This research method shows the subjective responses to quantitative relations between 15 variables and the level of rent-seeking. In view of research statistics we used is from published yearbook, the results are reliable.(4)According to the actual need of the study and conditions, this paper provides methods of variables and measures including using the percentage of filing cases of Post Crime and the number of public officials. Subject of Post Crime is mostly of the public officials who applying management public power, it can be manifested the level of rent-seeking with data of Post Crime, which is also the method many documents adopted. In contrast with them, this paper in admissibility of data has further chosen filing cases but not closed cases. Because closed cases are effected by complicated cases and efficiency as well as obvious indeterminacy, and it doesn't release data annually. The data is using on investigation and prosecution annually by local procuratorate in filing cases of Post Crime. Investigation is what inspection offices carried out a Preliminary Report of clues to criminal cases, if it believes that there are facts of a crime and do require investigation of drunk criminal responsibility, it shall be placed on files cases for investigation and prosecution in a litigation procedure according to law in criminal cases, which is the beginning of criminal responsibility. Because the criminal limits are unified and all the provinces release data each year, so that taking the percentage of filing cases of Post Crime and the numbers of public officials is realistic and objective. Furthermore, the effect factors of enforcement of legal system is the origin with the author which putting forward on rights strength and discretionary spaces of the right holders to measure discrepant of legal system. Rights strength is to assay a situation in administrative lawsuits by every province each year, while, discretionary spaces of the right holders is to weigh up by administration reconsider action cases. For the objectivity and feasibility of data, it takes by percentage of local public officials.In the process of Normative Analysis, it uses Correlation Analysis, Genetic Association Analysis and Clustering Analysis to make panel data from 31 provinces, cities and municipalities through 1997-2008 in Quantitative Analysis. It finds out there are 15 elements are relative with the level of rent-seeking, which are: the population of self-employed, foreign investment income, civil servants income, rights strength, discretionary power, per capita GDP, the population of non-agriculture, educational level, information index as well as environment and effect correlated positively with the level of rent-seeking, nevertheless, 5 elements that fiscal expenditure scale state, state budget, infrastructural facilities, central project and local project correlated negatively with the level of rent-seeking. In addition, these 15 elements affect the level of rent-seeking in varying degrees.
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