Inspiration And Coordination And Strategy Analysis In Supply Chain Under Trade Credit

As a result of the development of economic globalization and increased international competition in the market, many companies, even big companies or multinational corporations are likely to face financial constraints problems. Because of funding constraints, enterprises may not be able to achieve their operation goals under without these financial constraints. The competitiveness of modern enterprises is mainly reflected among the enterprise of it's supply chain, so the issue of funding constraints, will affect the decision-making and operating efficiency of enterprises, as well as the enterprise's supply chain performance and competitiveness, and may even affect the development of social stability. Therefore, Operations in supply chain management need to consider the impact of capital constraints. Only consider financial constraints and operation at the same time, can truly optimize the supply chain performance.Trade credit is widespread used in modern market economy, it can effectively reduce transaction costs and be seemed as short-term funding sources and occupies a large proportion in enterprise. In practice and a large number of studies of which consider it a major source of short-term financing. With the increasingly intensified competition in the market, trade credit is treated another new element of competition the same as quality, price, service and enhance corporate value and remain competitive strategic tool which can effectively help companies realize virtuous circle of information flow, business flow, logistics, capital flows, and improve the overall competitiveness of enterprises in general.The thesis pursues an in-depth research on supply chain contract design and inventory strategy under trade credit in finance-constrained supply chain, and evolutionary game analysis under trade credit in supply chain etc. The main contents are as follows:Chapter one introduces the research significance and present situation of supply chain coordination and strategy under trade credit, trade credit in supply chain. Then chapter two introduces some basic theories about finance-constrained supply chain so as to provide a theoretical frame work for the following studies.Chapter three analyzes decision-making model without trade credit and centralized decision-making model under trade credit. By model comparison, we confirm trade credit contract can achieve supply chain coordination. We obtain method to set trade credit contract parameters and it's reasonable scope. Chapter three analysis efficiency of the contract and give supply chain coordination strategies under trade credit.Trade credit strategies in supply chain formulation will be affected a variety of factors and assumptions, which are important to model analysis and conclusions. Much of exiting EOQ models consider to decide the optimal order quantity and cycle under trade credit tactic, Which seldom consider how to make supplier's trade credit strategy. From characteristics of commodities, market demand and market competition respectively, chapter four use of Stackelberg game model to give supplier's strategy and retailer's optimal order strategy under trade credit.Under trade credit, supplier divide credit period into three phases: cash discount period, all trade credit period, part trade credit period because retailer's different payment time point. Supplier uses the strategy which relies on pay time to encourage retailer to increase orders volume and shorten duration of pay time if possible. Chapter five establishes minimum inventory cost model and give theorem to determine retailer's optimal replenishment cycle and payment strategy under this case.Trade credit in supply chain evolves under interaction of external environment change and internal structure adjustment over time. Judging from the micro-level, trade credit is in an uncertainty and limited rational space and each other's strategies are interacted. Therefore, participants'repeat game in each stage constitutes of evolutionary game model. Chapter six use evolutionary game theory to establish supplier and retailer's evolutionary game model, which focuses on supplier and retailer's evolution and it's trend. The results show that: (1) information asymmetry and lack of government efforts is the root to break faith under trade credit in supply chain. Only when government punishment plus reputation loss more than income of keep faith, become supplier and retailer will gradually more actively implementation of keep faith strategy. (2) lack of government punishment or punishment isn't equilibrium, punishment will not plays an role to one party or both parties. So it will be in accordance with different situation to set appropriate punishment to let supplier and retailer keep faith. (3) loss of reputation is an effective supplement of punishment mechanism of Government against deception. So it is necessary to promote industrialization of the development of trade credit information, create a good trade credit environment, and reduce cost of trade credit search.