Research On Supply Chain Coordination Based On Credit Payment Under Fairness Preference

Traditional operation management research was based on the assumption that all members of the supply chain are rational.In fact,in the decision-making process,supply chain members will not only consider their own interests,but also compare with partners,that is,they will consider the behavior of fairness preference.In addition,with the fierce competition in the market,credit payment strategy has become an important business activity and a mutually beneficial means among enterprises.Many small and medium-sized enterprises have learned to use this important financial strategy to maintain their operations and earn interest.In this context,how the fairness preference behavior of supply chain members affects the decision-making and coordination of supply chain has become an important part of enterprise management.Through the study of domestic and foreign literature,it is found that most of the literature studies fairness preference through marketing efforts,but the articles that consider payment credit and preference together are rare.Therefore,in the context of credit payment,this paper studies the influence of fairness preference on supply chain equilibrium solution and supply chain members' decision-making by constructing Stackelberg game model,and establishes an incentive contract to increase market demand and coordinate supply chain.Aiming at maximizing the utility of supply chain,this paper mainly studies the following three aspects by means of literature research,modeling analysis and computer simulation.(a)In the context of the supply chain members are fair neutral,the supplier provides deferred payment period to the retailer and uses Stackelberg game to find the strategy to maximize the utility of the supply chain.Then,Matlab tool is used to analyze the relevant parameters to obtain the sensitivity analysis and explain the validity of the model in the paper;(b)In the context of suppliers providing deferred payment periods to retailers,from the perspective of maximizing supply chain utility,the Stackelberg game is used to find the optimal solutions under four decision instances:(i)the vendor and retailer are both fair neutral,(ii)only the retailer has a fairness preference,(iii)only the vendor has a fairness preference,and(iv)both the vendor and retailer have a fairness preference.Finally,a numerical example and its analysis are provided to analyze the influence characteristics of the parameters and obtain relevant management implications;(c)By selecting a situation,such as when the retailer has fairness preference,this articledesigns the supply chain contract to coordinate the supply chain under the condition that the supplier provides credit payment.Finally,a comparative analysis is carried out to verify the validity of the contract.The experimental results show that when the coefficient of the retailer's sympathy preference is small,the retailer's jealousy preference is only beneficial to itself,while the supplier's sympathy preference is beneficial to both the retailer and the supplier.In addition,in the incentive contract,when the profit distribution coefficient is within a certain range,the supply chain can be successfully coordinated,and suppliers and retailers will choose to join the incentive contract.Based on the delay payment provided by the supplier,this paper studies the decision-makingof supply chain members and supply chain coordination under the fairness preference,which can enrich the theory of fairness preference and credit payment,and has certain practical significance for guiding the decision-making of supply chain members under this background.