| The rural fiscal system in China posesses independence when it serves the path of national development,and support,reflect,restrain the rural behavior of all levels of the Government. Decentralization-governanced structures,as its operative framework, evolve in pursuit of value and efficiency with functions and value trends of the fiscal system changing. With the city and countryside integrating and the public finance covering rural China, all levels of governments increased the input of the countryside,and apparantly propelled rural development. But the decentralization-governanced structure'adjustments stumble along and the structural inherent defects continue to enlarge.The effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness of the governmental conduct haven't performed fully. In the available literature,the governance model has been conceived on the basis of the external value standards,and the governance programs to some chaos are presented.The defects in the practice and the lag of the theory determine the expected goals of the dissertation:1.May the whole structural evolution sequence be given one interpretation?What are the principles abided by in the structural evolutions?What are the theoretical tools to analysize the structural evolutions?2.In the actual structural evolutions,what factors can influence and how do they influence?In a word,what's the internal and external logic restricting the structural evolutions?3. Under the current situation what is the evolutional trend in the future and how is it propelled?Rsearch conclutions:In the papers, the analyses expand in perspective of the micro behavioral principals. The fiscal decentralization-governanced structure in rural China is defined the behavioal rules and relations among all levels of Government,farmers and their organizations practising rural public finance.It is the governance system including principals and their behavioral rules, based on the primary institutions. Based on the relations among principals and the evolutional prctice,it is distinguished into four patterns:the full control type, and the limited control type, and the technical governance type, and the limited participation type, and the full participation type. In line with the political and socical systems,the structural evolution equipment is defined for the central government to choose and construct. On basis of these propositins:the methodology individualism, the structure as artificial product, the structure in openness,by institution analysis theory and sequential game theory,in perspective of principals'behavior,it is infered that these evolutions are restrained by the structures themselves and the governance environment abiding by the structural logic and the outer logic,and both logic are conbined.The outer logic acts by the structural logic. On these premises,the conclutions below are reached.1. Rural fiscal decentralization-governanced structures' evolutions ocurr in the cyclic actions of "environment—objection—conduct—structure—perfomance". The governance environment proposes governance objections including value goals and real goals. Governance objections demand suitable actions.The structure consist of the rules which is the independent variables of principals'behavior functions. With structural evolutions,the choices of principal'behavior change and are restricted by other social relations,which lead to real perfomance.The gap between the perfomance and the original objections,and new changes of the environment propose new objections which want new strctural evolutions.2.The structural logic of the evolutions of the decentralization-governanced structure contains:i. When local Governments'revenue exceeds the farmer group'prospective return from the public finance, the full participation type and the promotion for non-agricultural expenditure belong to the dominant strategies;ii. When local Governments'revenue recedes from the farmer group' prospective return from the public finance with the growth and the income from capitals surpassing the cost of eliminating instability from their excess profit, the technical governance type is the weakly dominant strategy; iii. When local Governments' revenue recedes from the farmer group'prospective return from the public finance with the growth and the income from capitals lower than the cost of eliminating instability from their excess profit, the full control type and the promotion for non-agricultural expenditure are the dominant strategies.According to the "environment—conduct—structure" theory,principals(as risk neutrals)'behavioral functions are defined,including the structural parameters.Combined with the realities the mutual actions among all principals are explained by sequential game and the central government'choosing is the chance node of the game.The choosing of local governments and the public change with different struture and governance ways.The central government chooses governance structures and governance strategies to maximize its payoff,As a result the equilibrium comes true,the choices have Nash implementation.3.With concentrative and collective production organization transforming into traditional family patterns, enterprise-based production patterns,the possibility is reduced that the central government chooses the dominant strategies:the full control type and the promotion for non-agricultural expenditure,while the possibility of implementing the promotion strategy for agricultural expenditure is increased.The conclusion belongs to the external logic.The enviornment is simplified four elements:the property arrangement of agricultural land and production orgnizations,the economic and income growth,the original income gap,rentals.These elements'influence on the structural evolutions is based on the internal logic.They change the payoff function of the central government and act on the balanced choice of governance structures. With the property arrangement of agricultural land and production orgnizations changing,the production and income function of farmers and the payoff functions of all principals have their own changes.In the space of fiscal expenditure,the areas move belonging to the balanced structural choice of the central government.The possibility of the structural Nash implementation is changed.4. When the central government prefers the revenue growth,it hasn't the motive to implement the incentive strategy about agricultural expenditure;When local Governments'revenue exceeds the farmer group' prospective return from the public finance, the full participation type belongs to the dominant strategies,and when local Governments'revenue recedes from the farmer group' prospective return from the public finance, the technical governance type is the dominant strategy.Though goverments administer economic organizations and social organizations,their power is given by the people serving governments to supply public goods.The efficiency and effectiveness of the supplies are improved by the supervisions and balances, the adjustment, the integration from social and private organizations. Governmental organizations should obtain their revenue accoding to their responsibilities not for the sake of incomes. The dvelopment of private and social organizations relies on gveenment oganizations, government actions lack the restraints from regulations and the public,the occupation boundaries of government organizations,private and social organizations are not clear, government organizations involve in the micro-arragement of resources especially in competitive sectors resulting in the uncertainty of government functions and expenditure.Profit-driven behavior is rooted in the government organizations and is enlarged.The governmental preference to revenue changes the payoff function of the central government moving the boundary of the implementation of incentive strategies with the result that the space of expenditure changes in which the choice about structures has Nash implementation.5. When the central government prefers the economic growth,it hasn't the motive to choose the full control style;and when the productivity with non-agricultural expenditure is sufficient,there is no the range of the incentive to agricultural expenditure in the expenditure space,and when local Governments'revenue exceeds the farmer group' prospective return from the public finance, the full participation type and the promotion for non-agricultural expenditure belong to the dominant strategies; and when local Governments'revenue recedes from the farmer group' prospective return from the public finance, the technical governance type is the dominant strategy.The preference to the growth drives from the central government to maximize the whole social incomes.Regardless of income distribution,it ignores the social differences of income in its utility function, the areas of expenditure are caused to change which correspond to the central government'choices of balanced structures and governance strategies.6. When the central government lays emphasis on social development,the widening income gap renders the central government to choose the technical governance type and to motivate agricultural expenditure;When the central government's preferences are constant, the increment in rental income increases the possibility that the promotion incentive for agricultural expenditure is implemented,combined with the technical governance type. It is uncertain that the rapid economic growth lead to social progress, liberal and comprehensive development of every member.The value obliges the payoff of the central government to be decreased by the income gap and the rental,and lead to the choices of governance structures and means moving in the fiscal expenditure space. 7. "Revenue and expenditure unified", as the full control type,derived from the central government' rational choosing under the restraints of the reality and the goals.This choice was based on the evolutionay logic.Its adjustment took place under the restraints of the performance and the ideologies. The new regime is dislocated from the original politics and economy which lacked "the management of figure". The original government's fiscal capacity was low, the existing fiscal ability could't meet its domonance,and the new regime lacked the experienced governance of private sectors.But the "revenue and expenditure unified" type allows the central government to concentrate and distribute all the surplus of society helping it achieve social and economic domonances. The new regime having the ability to completely control and its members lacking private property became the strong action group.The realistic definition of the ideologies restrained the choice of the structure.The individual rationality of private economy and foreign threats also restricted the choice of the structure and the path of construction. Although by "revenue and expenditure unified" the central government can concentrate all of the social surplus to stabilize the regime and speed up economic recovery,the expenditure emphasized on building neglecting consumption.Local governments and production organizations lack the initiative to exploit their own information and resources spawing opportunistic behavior within the system.It is difficult to optimize resource arrgements. Under the restraints of ideology and domonance,the adjustment was limited to the inside of the government belonging to the re-arragement of executive power inside the hierarchical organization,it didn't reform the concentration and unity of the type.The economic growth was caught in the cycle of "decentralization and disorder, concentration and death". The rigid restraints of ideology and the politics of governance means strengthened and deteriorated the odd cycle.8. "Grade revenue and expenditure contracted" system,as the limited control type, alleviated the inherent defects of "revenue and expenditure unified" system breeding new defects. The "grade revenue and expenditure contracted" system doesnot belong to the central government'equlibrium set,but possesses pratical rationality,which enabled the local governments and farmers to turn into relatively independent profit and production organizations by the contract and executive decentralization activating the production organizations and the local governments to increase production and income,graually breaking through the original ideology.But the local governments and farmers still lacked the effective incentives and restraints, their short -term behavior caused the growth to lack the endurance.The governance structure had not eradicated completely the defects of the full control type:The macro economy still displayed violent fluctuations.Deciding the cardinal sum and the allocation proportion little scientifically and regularly in the contracts increased transaction cost and reduced incentive effect. The most urgent realistic threat was that the central government had the diminished revenue not to control and incite the local governments.9.The "tax-sharing" system,as the technical governance type,had increased the revenue of the central government and had changed the income-created behavior of the local governments and had realized diversifying and technologizing governance means.But it had caused the county-town public finance to attenuate and farmers'loads to aggravate continually,the opportunities of seeking rent and trsansacting existing in the governance.In the technical governance type,all governments obtained their revenue by shared taxes propelling the reform of micro-property and the formation of a unified market,the central government got a variety of governance means by transfer payments,but local governments didn't remove their seeking interests and obtained their incomes by the transaction of the control of power and resources in the markets under the pressure of increasing incomes,with the result that the extra-budgetary revenue and non-budgetary revenue expanded,at the same time the governance indicators and the regulations of procedure haven't given the expected restraints influenced by social relations embedded.10. The trend of the evolutions of rural public finance decentralization-governanced structures is to the full participation type.To regulate the forms of governments' revenue and expenditure and to improve budget management and technology raised the efficiency of the supply of public goods.To improve the structure of the indicators, and to standardize the technologies and the procedures,and to establish accountability improve the public financial expenditures. However, for the lack of the incentives and restraints from public demands,and the increment of governance cost,the improvement of governance tools and technologies failed to achieve the desired goals.As a prominent example, the total lack coexists with the structural excess.According to the evolutionary logic,the governance structure trend to the full participation type.Profiting from technical governance derives from governments seeking interests,the dominance of independent property needs the public expenditures,the development of the society trends to benefit every member.These requirements from the environment ask for full participation. The full participation type itself can compress the "rent-setting and rent-seeking" space,and eliminate the government's profit-incentives enabling the governments to subject to the public interest,and embed the dominance of the public demands in the fiscal revenue and expenditure.Policy suggestions:1. The limited participation type should be established, while the mechanism and mode of local government budgets are remodeled. The limited participation type doesn't the rational choices of the central government,but the strategy is content with practical rationality, on the one hand which effectively breaks" the ceremony locked" and gradually removes the path dependence,on the other hand which acumulates experiences to establish the full participation type by the learning mechanism. Additionally, the limited participation type has the facilities for its implementation and affords enough participation incentives.It is helpful to the dominance of public demands to be realized,and can raise the efficiency and effectiveness of fiscal expenditures. The fiscal decentralization have a good micro-foundation.2. The power configuration among all levels of governments should be improved.The responsibility-power-interest configuration matching the full participation type can be established by evolution,but the course is long and costly.The dominance of the central government can adjust the responsibility-power-interest configuration constructively. The existence of governments derives from their responsibilities which are their unique goals. Responsibilities are arranged among all levels of government according their information structures and their abilities,abiding by the principles of efficiency. Expenditures of all levels of government are determined on the basis of the divisions of responsibilities. Power is a means to perform their responsibilities including financial power and decision power, the interests incites government officials to perform their responsibilities efficiently, responsibility-power-interest is required harmonies.3. The ways of governance should be perfected.The governance ways of decentralization-governanced structures serve intentions of the central government by motivating local governments and farmers, and changing their behavior functions and payoff functions. The improvement of governance ways should focus on transfer payments, incentive restraints and basic restraints.Main innovations:1.A new perspective in the fiscal decentralization researches:The available literature focuses on the efficiency of fiscal decentralizations and the effective decentralization neglecting its mechanism of realization. In the dissertation, to explore fiscal decentralizations in perspective of the fiscal decentralization-governanced structure and the evolution strengthens its micro bases and discovers tis process influence.2.The distinction of the fiscal decentralization-governanced structure and the analytic framework on the structural evolutions:Based on the relations among principals and the evolutional prctice,it is distinguished into four patterns:the full control type, and the limited control type, and the technical governance type, and the limited participation type, and the full participation type. On basis of these propositins:the methodology individualism, the structure as artificial product, the structure in openness,by institution analysis theory and sequential game theory,in perspective of principals'behavior, the analytic framework:"environment—conduct—structure" is presented.3. The basic logic of the evolutions of the decentralization-governanced structure is discovered. Its evolutions take place in pursuit of value and efficiency and on the basis of original institutions and environment changes.In line with the specical political structure,the internal logic(the efficiencey logic) is embodied by the central government'choosing based on the structural results.The external logic is discovered the influence of the property arrangement of agricultural land and production orgnizations,the economic and income growth,the original income gap,rentals on the structural evolutions.4.The verification of the trend of the evolutions of rural public finance decentralization-governanced structures:Viewed the current structure and the environmental characteristics as the original conditions,the trend of the evolutions of structures is discovered by the evolution rules to be proved.The trend is obtained scientifically and realistically.
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