The Effect Analyses And Evaluation Of State-owned Enterprise Property Rights Institution Reforms

State-owned Enterprise Reforms (SER), the reform about changing inefficiency of conventional planned economy system and coordinating the relationship of government and enterprises, not only destroyed conventional "three equals one" system, but also changed the basic features of Chinese social and economic system continuously. For the whole viewpoint of SER, the writer found that the meaning of SER is related to the realistic judgment and theoretical analysis of Chinese society, economy and politics. Furthermore, especially historical choice of SER policy is also related to many fortuitous events and random psychological fluctuation. Seeing that it, our research project is beginning at logic thought and united judgment on the price of SER, its major analysis is about realistic features of reform achievement and strategic equilibrium of reform subject game. Based on the analysis approach of evolvement or belief equilibrium of institutional evolvement game, the research project built an effect analysis framework of State-owned Enterprise Property Right Institution Reforms which is toward whole circumstances and identical logic program.The starting point of our project research is about the formation and development of reform agents and related interest constitution in the process of SER. The further analysis is based on subject game and itsequilibrium characteristics of property rights institution reform. After subject rationality effect, society stabilization effect and economy sureness effect of property rights institution reform were presented, the reform of Yunnan Copper Group Company was studied in order to explain the realistic features of SER. Moreover, special meaning of resource stated-owned enterprise reform was presented in view of our economy sureness. The stopover of our project research is game mechanism and effect evaluation of property institution reform. While the effect analysis of SER was related the theoretical framework of institutional evolvement game, the reciprocal relationship between reform policy choice and reform subject game was explained theoretically, effect evaluation of property rights institution reform was built on the basement of better subject ration.We mainly studied subject rationality effect, society stabilization effect and economy sureness effect of State-owned Enterprise property right institution reform. The essential points of the research were contradiction and coordination of reform subject interest, institutional evolvement regulation of reform subject interest constitution, and strategic equilibrium of institutional evolvement. The research suggested that SER is an evolvement process of subject game. The property institution reform effects revealed enrichment of reform subject rationality, equilibrium choice of reform subject strategy, and relatedchange of reform game rule in the subject game process. While the property institution reform effect was considered as the realistic features of reform subject game equilibrium, the policy choice of property institution reform and reciprocal relationship of reform subject game could be unified in a same logic analysis framework. Because reform game and reform effect may be unified in a analysis framework of subject evolvement game and reform achievement was seen as a psychological equilibrium of special reform circumstance, there exists necessary logic relationship between game mechanism analysis of reform subject and effect evaluation of reform process.