China's Joint-stock Commercial Banks Control The Validity Of Research | Posted on:2007-02-16 | Degree:Doctor | Type:Dissertation | Country:China | Candidate:R R Ge | Full Text:PDF | GTID:1119360212460446 | Subject:Management Science and Engineering | Abstract/Summary: | PDF Full Text Request | The corporate governance for commercial bank has different features from general industry and commerce enterprises and the more strict requirements have to be put forward for the "justice governance" of bank based on the frangibility of banking industry; the corporate governance level of bank can influence on national financial safety; the control of stakeholders must be paid particular attention to because of the high social commonality (also called as externality) in corporate governance of commercial bank; the creditors with passive liabilities cannot exert their efforts in corporate governance of banking company; the imperfect competition of product market has weakened the exterior constraint; the asymmetric condition of bank information can also make it more severe; the supervision and control of banking industry has double action for the corporate governance of their companies because the merger and acquisition costs of bank is greatly more than general company and the pressure of supervision is comparatively weak. The above-mentioned factors have increased the difficulty of bank governance and shown the significance for strengthening the bank governance.This thesis proposes the analytical framework and basic contents of corporate governance in commercial bank of our country on the basis of summarizing the theory and practice of corporate governance in foreign companies, especially in foreign commercial banks, and combining the system environment, reform target and particularity of corporate governance in Chinese banking industry.Firstly, this thesis focus on four influence modes of stock ownership structure in commercial bank to company corporate governance and proposes the influence of stock ownership structure having double existences for internal and external conditions of company corporate governance; the conclusion is: first, it is unilateral to consider the deconcentration of stock ownership is beneficial to corporate governance . of commercial bank in theory, the concentration of stock ownership is a kind of... | Keywords/Search Tags: | corporate governance, agent cost, decision-making mechanism, incentive-restrictive mechanism, supervision-evaluating mechanism, governance evaluating | PDF Full Text Request | Related items |
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