The Corporate Governance Of Chinese Commercial Banks After Facing Reform

With the opening of the finance industry and the deepenning of the reform, the reformation of the state-owned commercial banks has become a focus issue.The root of the main problems of the stated-owned commerical banks, such as the high unhealthy-asset rate, the low capital adequacy ratioin the low efficency of the governmence.The essence of the so-called corporate governance is the arrangement of the ownership of the enterprises. The core is to solve the agency problem under the condition of the separation between ownership and control power. Generally, the form of cororate governance is a series of the contract rules framed by the governance institution concerning the stockholder conference, the board of director and the supervision committee, aiming at proteting the interests of stakeholders that have joined the enterprise contract. So, the definition of state-owned commercial banks governance can be concluded as the following: it is a kind of institution arrangement, organization formation and operation mechanism that connect and regulate the mutual rights and interests of shareholders, debtors,and so on under a certain arrangement of ownership system. The essence of the state-owned commercial banks governance is the distribution of responsibility and right as well as a system of the check and balance. Its core is the mechanism of incentive and restraining aimming at the manager levels of the banks, with the purpose of maximizing the value of the bank. To definite it from the view of risk management, commercial banks governance is a set of institutional arrangement urging bank managers to effectively protect the interests of the stakeholders during their risk allocation activities. The content of commercial banks governance is to maintain the operation of risk allocation contract safely,in order to ensure the interests of the shareholders, depositors, borrowers and the owners of human resource and the government that join in the contract of commercial banks based on the rational distribution of the ownership of banks through a series of mechanisms like market governance and gobernmental supervision, etc.The dissertation is divided into five parts,as follows:Part one, a theoretical review. The domestic and foreign scholars on the concept of corporate governance and corporate governmence theory reviewed. Part two is to introduce the particularity of the commercial bank and general companies.Part three, China's state-owned commercial banks reform process and themain problems. Currently, the Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Industry and Commerce Bank of China have Joint-stock reform successfully.But China's state-owned commercial banks still exist the problem which operational efficiency is not high. Analysis the reasons for the low efficiency. The reason is mainlythat internal corporate governance is imperfect, such as property is not clear,the owner becomes vacant. At the same time, External governancemechanisms do not perfect.Part four, analyse the corporate government models of Deutsche Bank and Citibank which can guide the reform in China. By analyzing the situation of corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks, the benefit and the loss of Chinese joint-stock commercial banks in corporate governances, we put forward a systemmatic way to solve the problems.Part five,state-owned commercial banks improve corporate governancepath. The main path is to perfect internal corporate governance, such as stockreform and improvement of incentive and restrictive mechanism. At the sametime, it needs to perfect external governance, such as improve Capital markets,products and external market supervision mechanism.