Research On Guarantee Behaviors Of China's Listed Corporations

In a sample of guaranteeing corporations in China's A-shares this dissertation analyzes the institutional background of guaranteeing in Chinese capital market, then investigates the relationship between corporate value and guaranteeing, based on the result, this paper further analyzes the micro-factors affecting guarantee behavior from corporate governance perspective.Our results show that: (1) The risk of guaranteeing is serious, this can be seen from the increasing number of corporations involving guaranteeing and the form of guaranteeing, most of them guaranteed for their subsidiary companies and non-related parties, what's more, overdue and illegal guaranteeing has an increasing tendency. (2) There is a negative relationship between guaranteeing and corporate value. Value measured by Tobin's Q is lower for corporations with guaranteeing than that of corporations without guaranteeing. In comparison with corporations without guaranteeing, the value of corporations with guaranteeing balance is much lower. The value of corporations with overage guaranteeing is significantly lower than that of non-overage guaranteeing. (3) Ownership structure significantly influences corporation guarantee behavior. There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and guarantee behavior. The probability of guarantee behavior of non-state-owned corporations is higher than that of corporations controlled by state. The influence of ownership balancing mechanism on guarantee behavior is different in corporations of different types of ultimate controlling shareholders. In state-owned corporations, there is a positive relationship between overage guaranteeing and Z index. On the contrary, there is a negative relationship between overage guaranteeing and Z index in non-state-owned corporations. (4) Board characters have a significant influence on guarantee behavior. There is a negative relationship between number of independent directors and overage guaranteeing in corporations voluntarily hiring independent directors. There is a negative relationship between number of directors with ownership and overage guaranteeing, a negative relationship between percentage of ownership owned by chairman and overage guaranteeing. Meanwhile, in corporations of scattered ownership, there is a negative relationship between overage...