Research On The Motivity And The Strategy Selection Model Of The Corporate Political Action

In western countries, many corporates (especially the big enterprises) have brought political strategies into the area of corporates' strategy management. Through using diversified corporate political action strategies, they gained many profits, accumulated abundant political experiences, held mature political skills and high-level strategy implementation abilities. These corporate political actions not only had been well used in the normative market economy environment of western countries, but also embodied its prominent effect in the Chinese transformation environment which the market and legal system consummated step by step. But now in China the research of corporate political action is still in the initial stage, so the research space is capacious and learned value is high.Through ameliorating the regulation equilibrium forming mechanism model in regulation economy and Porter's five forces competiton model in strategy management theory, this paper studied on the motivation and strategies of corporate political action. The main research content and views of this paper as follows:(1) Study on the motivation of corporate political action. From profit maximum character of corporate and through establishing the model of interactional relation of corporate & government, we got that corporate's profit was mainly influenced by five political methods: price cap, quantity control, corporate resource control, entering and quitting interference. According to different corporate request, the motivation of corporate political action could be classified as efficiency motivation, strategy motivation and utilitarian motivation; according to different corporate reaction, the motivation of corporate political action could be classified as passive and active motivation.(2) Study on the functionary mechanism of corporate political action. Though mending the promise-credit model in the marketing area, we got that government and corporate is the interest relative of each other. They need the other side to attain their goals, so corporate political actions can exert its functions. Then based on these conclusions we established the dissimilation game model of interest groups in regulation process from the realistic relationship, different goals and reactions among consumer, corporate and government. We extended the Stigler—Peltzman model from static to dynamic, studied the evolutive orbit of government regulation from its initial design to its final enforcement result, and also through deeper deduction & case study we got the conclusion: there are mainly two functionary mechanisms and approaches of corporate political action's cryptic influence on dynamic regulation equilibrium. Firstly, making use of the comparative static characteristic of regulation policy to result in the regulation deviation by shielding information. Secondly, weakening the force of customers and changing the marginal rate of substitution of governmental utility.(3) Analysis on the influence factors of corporation political action strategy. Through analyzing the relation between corporation political action and corporate strategy we found that government regulation and public policy can influence corporation political action strategy originated from two factors. First is government factor. It mainly because of government dominating large amount of resource, government itself is a huge consumer and the faultiness of laws and policies. Second is non-government factor. This factor is maily correlated with the political ability of corporate and intervened corporate's organization character, industry character and the character of political affairs.(4) Study on the selection means of corporation political action strategy. We created the concept of political market attraction, analyzed the correlation between political market attraction and the selection of corporation political action strategy and used the tools of strategy management theory to brought forward the strategic mode selective model of corporate political action. The conclusion as follows: low competition among demanders and servant suppliers and high competition among official suppliers make the political market is attractive to the corporate, the opposite is not; according to different influence on the political market attraction caused by demanders and suppliers, there are four choice for the corporate, pacemaker strategy, conservative pacemaker strategy, henchman strategy and wait-and-see strategy; according to its political resource and ability, the corporate can select from three kinds of strategy implementation styles, solo, collective and mixed.(5) The rule problem of Chinese corporate political action. Linking the difference between China and western countries and using empirical study we investigated the rule problem of Chinese corporate political action. After visitation and the analysis of the questionnaires we found out that now in China many corporate political actions were no formal rules, even the actions which had rules many corporates still ignored them. We also found the informants negated many corporate political actions exsit in China. So we put forward some advice on mending the Chinese corporate political action rules: first, establishing new rules and consummating existent rules; second, banning the negative corporate political actions; third, strengthening the supervision of the corporate political actions.