Relative Performance Management Contribution To The State-owned Enterprise Managers Income Distribution,

In recent years, centered around the strategic adjustment of state-owned economy's distribution and structure, the enterprises' restructure with joint-stock as the main form and improvement of its internal control structure and all other factors, the reform of SOE is developing in depth. The fierce debate on the reform of state-owned enterprises brought out by "Lang and Gu" is just an episode for recent years, and it didn't change a lot, the reform is still on its way. However, as the reform of SOE further deepens, the operators' performances and income distributions which acts as the core role in SOE operators' incentive and restraint mechanisms are becoming more and more important. Actually, since the foundation of SAC, it has already been raised as an important problem. Meanwhile, together with the reform and restructure of SOE, the operators' income level is always rising which has been a disputable fact. As part of disparity problem in income distribution, the rapid growth of operating income is more and more concerned by the public.The operators' income in SOE should be related with their managerial contribution, while enterprise's absolute performance is not an accurate information for the operators' managerial contribution. According to the SCP mode and resource--based view, the quantity and quality of business resources and the market structure are the main reasons of the difference among enterprises' performance. So it's more accurate to evaluate executive achievement from the history and the industry performance. After reviewing the domestic and foreign studies and investigating the operators' managerial contribution in SOE, based on REP hypothesis in the principal-agent theory, this paper systematically studies how to design an effective income distribution system which can reflect the operators' managerial contribution in SOE.So in this paper, we discussed as follows:In chapter I and chapter II ,we made an brief introduction together with the literature review related. The discussion mainly includes topic background, relevant definition, theoretical and practical significance with the expected benefits of our study, logical framework, literature review related and all the others. And we will give focus on the premise of the study and lay the theoretical foundation.In chapter III,we recalled the reform history of SOE, and then made the dialectical analysis in view of the popular theoretical perspective that the operators of SOE have overall low income with the incentive not strong enough. And through qualitative and quantitative analysis, we get the key issues of the income distribution system of SOE. That is, lack of relative performance evaluation so that it cannot better reflect the operators' management contributions,The relative performance evaluation theory in principal-agent theory proves that, by adding the relevant performance information into the agent's contract, we can achieve economic Pareto improvement. And so the operators always grab large amounts of limited liability tenants, less responsible for losses. They ignore the interests of relevant stakeholders, with the assessment of environment performance in particular.In the fourth and fifth parts, we made a theoretical analysis on the operator's management contribution from microscopic and macroscopic levels. As from the microscopic level, we have management contribution divided into two parts: labor value contribution and Schupeter rent which reflects the operator's talent, while management contribution with policy objectives can be implemented by the value in use creation and cost savings. Meanwhile, the operator's decision-making risk is attached into the evaluation model of management contribution. And then it tells the economic reason bringing out the difference in enterprise microscopic performance. So we can come to the principle of the operator's relative performance evaluation. At the macro level, by considering economic welfare as the evaluation criteria, with external environment brought out by the business activities corporated into the assessment, the management contribution evaluation becomes more objective and comprehensive. Meanwhile, in this paper we further proved that external environment out of competitiveness can be fully internalized, and then the management contribution of operators of SOE should make the microscopic economic performance as the evaluation criteria, while due to the weightness of anti-monopoly and anti-pollution in the monopoly SOE, the operators' management contribution should take the economic welfare as the criteria. At the end of this part, we combined the micro and macro, and then made a further discussion on the establishment of evaluation indicators of SOE operators' management contribution.Chapter VI mainly deals with the operator's income distribution system in SOE. In this paper, the SOE operator's income includes basic salary, performance pay and middle-term or long-term equity. And our study focused on the incentive compensation and the equity incentives, then we constructed the theoretical model based on the excitation intensity of relative performance, and discussed the strategic effect of the operator's pay system based on the relative performance. Finally we made some discussion on the trial equity incentives of our state-owned companies listed in the current market, and also made an empirical research on the negative effects brought by stock circulation. We finally talked about the issue of pricing the operator human capital of SOEs by the maket.In chapter W,we drew the conclusion out of our study, and gave some policy advice, and we also pointed out those inadequate aspects to be pended.