Research On The Innovation Of Property To Rural Cooperatives Finance

"Three Fs" (Agriculture, Rural Areas and Farmers) problems restrains the nationaleconomy and society development. As the core of capital allocation in rural economy, RuralFinancial System (RFS) performs the essential functions in solving the issues of "Three Fs".Whereas RFS can't satisfy the comprehensive financial demands for rural economydevelopment. Rural Credit Cooperative (RCC) performance is imperfect and bad loansproportion has been increasing. The property right institution of RCC has become focus anddifficulty of rural financial system reform.Reform of RCC has an important significance in the reform of rural financial system.Therefore, it is the breakthrough of rural financial system reform and research purpose of thisthesis. It explores the innovation pattern of rural credit cooperative property rights (RCCPR),analyzes the inherence contradictions of RCC and clears property rights in order to improvecorporate governance,On the basis of theories of money and finance, cooperative economics, the newinstitution economics and property rights economics, this thesis takes the property rights ofRCC as the masterstroke, sets up the research framework of RCCPR, and explores vicissitudelaw of international cooperative financial institution (ICFI), analyzes empirically theperformance of RCCPR, and puts forward the innovation framework of RCCPR.Through comparative analysis, this dissertation analyzes different cooperative financialinstitution and its evolution, sums up the vicissitude law of modern cooperative financeinstitution, explores the pattern of ICFI in china. Through deduct analysis, it analyzesempirically the present faults and issues of RCCPR by adopting questionnaire. On the basis ofnormative analysis, it puts forward the thoughts to innovate policies and exterior institutionsof RCCPR. The main research tasks and conclusions can be summed up as following:Firstly, this dissertation focuses on the vicissitude law of ICFI through reviewing thehistoric vicissitude process of ICFI, analyzes the vicissitude features and causes for RCCPRin China. The findings of this dissertation are that vicissitude of ICFI resulted from thecontradiction between the inner imperfection of ICFI and the exterior environment change. Asfar as a cooperative finance organization is concerned, its change path should be transformedfrom profits-seeking into nonprofits-seeking, from labor association into capital association,from credit cooperative organization, which serves to members into commercial financialorganization. Across the world, whether developing countries or developed countries, it is acommon characteristic of rural financial market in all countries that commercial finance institution and cooperative finance institution coexist. In other words, commercial financeinstitution can't replace cooperative finance institution. This conclusion provides the theorybasis for RCCPR reform in China.Secondly, on the basis of the current characteristics of rural finance development, interms of institution demand, this dissertation demonstrates the inevitability of developingrural cooperative finance and the cooperative finance function orientation in rural financesystem in China, proves that RCFI is the guarantee to satisfy the capital demand of thedisadvantaged rural people and RCFI adapts the extensive and imbalance of productive forcesin China, RCFI is necessary to overcome the agriculture weakness. Above-mentionedviewpoints clarify and correct the fallacy that RCCPR isn't appropriate to China.Thirdly, this dissertation establishes creatively the theoretical framework of RCCPR. Inthe contract of RCC, the arrangement of RCCPR should adhere to the logic of contract thatstockholders of rural credit cooperative, depositors and manpower capital owners share thepossessing right and the control right of RCC. On the basis of the corporate governanceparticularities of RCC, the author cast doubt on the fact that the logic of stockholdersgovernance doesn't suit the corporate governance pattern of RCC for the first time. Thecorporate governance goals of RCC should be the maximization of stakeholders' interests. Itscorporate governance model should be co- governed by stakeholders and stockholders.Fourthly, the dissertation studies the status quo of RCCPR by questionnaire and drawssome conclusions: the RCC should be defined as the cooperative finance institution that isowned and managed by members, provides services to members and operates on the basis ofcooperative principles, but the above principles of normative cooperative finance aren'treflected genuinely in China. Member enrollment is compelling and decentralizing. They areuseless of the general meeting of members, the board of directors and the board of supervisors.The RCC can't operate effectively and self-reliant, assume sole responsibility for its profits orlosses. It is very serious of the phenomenon of inside control under administrativeintervention. In short, the three principles of cooperative finance in RCC aren't reflectedgenuinely. Meanwhile, the author points out that the inner mechanisms result fi'om the issuesof RCCPR. The inner mechanisms are as follows: The separation between residual claimrights and residual control rights, the problems of Principal-Agent, the asymmetricinformation of RCC, the shortage of enough impetus and pressures to reform the corporategovernance structure of RCC. Above-mentioned researches promote the theory of RCCPR toinstitutional level.Fifthly, the dissertation designs the basic reform framework of RCCPR. The reform goals of RCCPR are to insist on serving "Three Fs", operate self-reliant, assume soleresponsibility for its profits or losses and select diversified property rights according to localconditions. Rural commercial bank is suitable for the developed area where the level ofindustrialization is high and the demand for agricultural loan is little. Rural cooperative bankcan fulfill profits and provide service to members. As far as the RCC of undeveloped areas isconcerned, it is a feasible financial institution. Normative RCC serve members and doesn'tseek profits, therefore, it is suitable for the poverty areas.Sixthly, The dissertation brings forward the co-governance pattern of stakeholders. Thecore of co-governance of stakeholders is that, every property entity should have equal chanceto participate the allocation of ownership. Meanwhile, the behavior of very property entity arerestricted by the mechanism of supervision, the stabilization of stakeholders cooperationdepends on the mechanism of ballot and the mechanism of interests restriction in order torealize the maximization of stakeholders interests. The mechanism of co-governance ofstakeholders must guarantee that every property entity should have equal chance to participatethe important decision-making by setting up the mechanism of co-decision-making of theboard of directors. The mechanism of co-governance of stakeholders must guarantee thatevery property entity should share equal right of supervision to fulfill the balance of power bysetting up the mechanism of co-supervision of the board of supervisors. The supervisionmechanism of co-governance of stakeholders is societal supervision by establishing the openand transparent mechanism of issuing information.Seventhly, This dissertation puts forward the basic framework that the reform of RCCPRshould strive to establish and improve the polices and institutions of RCC, which includetaxation policy, free interest rate, rural financial system, agricultural insurance systems,deposit insurance systems, supervision system, rural finance administration and functionorientation of province-joint rural credit cooperative and so on.