Research On Decision-Making Problems Under Government Guarantees In Infrastructure BOT Projects

With the fast development of BOT (Built-Operate-Transfer) which is a project financing model usually implemented in the developing country's infrastructure projects, a series problems of BOT has become a hotspot that arouses great concern of academia. At present, the study relate to BOT mostly focus on the project risk and the concession term, and most of these researches haven't considered one of situations in the practical operating that the government often give the project company some guarantees. Based on this, this dissertation focus on the decision-making when the government give project company some guarantees. To facilitate following study, this dissertation firstly classified the guarantees that the government can give the project company at present. At the same time, considering the specific project probably only fit a specific guarantee, the guarantee's scope of application be defined.Concession term guarantee is one of the most important government guarantees in the BOT project According to different stress aspects, two concession term guarantee decision-making models were constructed. First, using the game theory set up a concession term decision-making model under a condition that demand is increase constantly over time. Then get the optimum concession term decision of the government Through analyzing variables that influence both sides' decision making, some suggestions for the government obtained, and using an application demonstrates the model's feasibility. The merit of this model is that its analytic solution facilitates to discuss the relation between the concession term and the associated variables. Secondly, considering the present literature merely using the social benefits as the criteria to make decision, this dissertation develops another concession term model of BOT projects by modifying that model based on the principle of social benefits. Furthermore, the modified model considered the difference of social benefits in different projects, and provide government three negotiation rules, which all of them can ensure produce maximum social benefits and also can protect project company's enthusiasm on investing at the same time.The consideration of purchase guarantee will inevitably relate to the market demand condition, therefore the competing restrain guarantee has been considered simultaneously. Two game models including that project company have products purchase guarantee and competing restrain guarantee at the same time, and only has the competing restrain guarantee established under the criteria that maximize society consumer surplus. Based on the discussion of equilibrium, problems in the present method which government use to decide the guaranteed purchase volume obtained. The application also demonstrates the conclusion that the optimum purchase volume of the government certainly less than the volume determined by the traditional method is correct The comparative result reveals the fundamental reason that the project company strives for getting competing restrain guarantee. Compared with only providing the competing restrain guarantee, the total consumer surplus decrease when government provides these two guarantees. So although the government provides the competing restrain guarantee based on have given the products purchase guarantee can enhance the investing enthusiasm of the project company, but the decrease of social welfare means that the government must decide this modestly.Price adjustment guarantee can enhance the ability of the company to adapt to changes in the external economic environment, and then to protect its earnings. This dissertation presents two different price adjustment mechanisms based on which the government can give the price adjustment guarantee. The first one is the two-stage price mechanism used in BOT power plant project. This mechanism possesses the nature of protecting social welfare, and that is not achieved by the governmental price regulation but the mechanism design. By further comparing between the nature of the Two-Stage Electricity Price Mechanism and the similar prices regulation theory, it find that the mechanism for infrastructure BOT plant projects has some positive effect on protecting the social welfare, promoting the power system reform, reducing the project risk undertaken by the government and increasing the enterprises' investment interest. At last, an application demonstrates how to use the mechanism's nature of prices limitation. Another one is the restricted price adjustment mechanism. Under the government guarantee based on this mechanism, the project company allowed to carry on price adjustment without exceeding the number of times and range that the government limited. This mechanism also strengthens the project company's adaptive capacity to the economic environment changes and improves its enthusiasm of investing in BOT projects. At the same time, the government also can control the price adjustment's impact on national economic development. The feasibility of the government and the project company to do decision-making under this government guarantee based on the restricted price adjustment mechanism also has tested.