Research On The Benefits Relationships In The Process Of Land Requisition

Land is the most basic condition of what mankind exists and the most essential element of production, in times gone by behave a type a society to see the concern and jean. In recent years the scope of land requisition becomes wider and the amount is bigger with the rapid development of urbanization and industrialization,such as several-storied building construction, city extension, the industry construction, railroad and highway construction and etc.In our country,who want to use farmland on account of total benefits and originally collective outside of all units or personal construction have to advertise for ground through a government first and change into a collective land a nation all after, then can acquire land of usage power. This kind of advertises carried out under the background that our country high planned economy output, which matched the demand of economic development and industry policy and developed positive effect at that time. In the process of the planned economy to the market economy,the current land requisition system make the farmer benefits severity damaged, which cause the process of land requisition full of antinomy and the relationship between the farmer and the government depraved,which influenced the society stability. Statistics according to the department concerned,1/3 above of crowd's petition attribute to land problem, but among them 60% directly from advertise for land requisition in 2002.The core problem of the land requisition is to protect the farmers' right and to handle the conflicts between the government and collective farmers, collective farmers and personal farmers. This paper breakthrough the simplicity studies from the system angle, but from the benefits conflict,and concerns for the behavior of the government.The government is divided into central government and local government, and they are direct principle-agent because that the national prestige of our country is unitary. In the process of land requisition,the local government representative national benefit entrusted by the central government,who impose the interest of who use the land(obtain usage power in the land). The purpose of the local government is the achievement, finance and tax and personal benefits,so the adverse selection and moral hazard existed in the agency relation. The strength of the principle and the weakness of the agent must to be the failure of the relationship between principle-agent.The local government acquires a huge benefit in the process of land requisition because of the low cost via high income. As"economic person"the local government must monopoly the land what can be requisitioned and control the price of the land which can make the interest maximization.As the economic person,the officials of the government also always pursue how to maximize the income of control power. In the present period of transformation this kind of impulse shows evidently. They can usually acquire abnormality big illegal income in addition to various proper incomes. Therefore the political promoted with extension income that controlled by political power encourages the staff member of the government work hard. For pursuing good achievement and accumulating political capital the better choice is to extend the scale of the land requisition for the officials of the government. So the officials of the government who has political power often extend the quantity of land supply in order to maximize benefit of himself,regardless disobeying economic regulation.In the process of land requisition the behavior for institutional rent-seeking of the government influences the latent balanced and the welfare in the land market,which harmed the economic welfare of the countryside collective. It is clearly that at the beginning the local government doesn't discover this kind of rental space and take action. After established the system of land requisition,along with development and prosperity of land market, they gradually realize this kind of profits. Now this part of profits have become the main source of the public finance,so the government were still unwilling to give up this part of profits although they already be aware of what they have done have injured the benefits of the countryside collective.The game behavior of the local government is divided into three layers:the games between the local government and the farmers who lost land,the games between the local governments and the games between the local government and central government. In the model of the games between the local government and the farmers the advantage that the local government illegally land requisition becomes less and legally land requisition becomes bigger ,at the same time the punishment cost that the local government illegally land requisition becomes bigger and the punishment cost that the local government legally land requisition becomes less ,which advertises for the farmers. So the equilibrium is that the local government legally land requisition and the farmers obey the rule. In the model of the games between the local governments the government should propose scientific development view and correct achievement view,and raise probability that finding and keeping watch on who use land illegally. At the end punishment cost of illegally land requisition should be bigger. In the model of the games between the local government and central government the central government should keep the strong deterrent force.Through investigation we find that the local government is the most important factor in the process of land requisition in Liaoning province,who can decide the land requisition and allocate the compensation,which is similar to the whole country. Beyond all doubt the local government becomes the most main benefit and at the same time the farmer benefits damaged,and then the benefits conflict continuously arouse to turn. The substantial evidence analysis conclusion verified the theory research. In the process of land requisition,the local government is an absolute leader, who almost controlled the whole process and the activity of"rent-seeking"is popular. Though the farmer game with the local government,the phenomenon of"rent-seeking"is existence because of the huge benefits inducement. So the behavior of the local government is basic reason of the creation benefits conflict in the process of land requisition.This paper follows the research way of thinking that the theory research combines together with substantial evidence analysis, using macroscopic level data combined with microscopic level data,and then analysis the benefit allocation with the method of step analysis and single factor,which study the relationship among related corpus in the process of land requisition.The full paper divides 5:Chapter 1 elaborates the meanings of this paper and induces the domestic and international present condition of this paper related research, and then points out the research obtain of result currently and further study;Chapter 2 analysis the reasons of the benefits conflict and then find the system reason of the benefits conflict; Chapter 3 classify the central government and local government firstly and then analysis the behavior of the local government as it is a"economic person",including the behavior of"rent-seeking"and game activity; Chapter 4 takes Liaoning province as an example of evidence analysis to a medium benefits relation in the course of the land requisition;Finally in the conclusion part puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to resolve the problem of the farmers lost land ,which can moderate the benefits conflict and then the work of land requisition can carry out smoothly.